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AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF TWO JOINT COST ALLOCATION 
SCHEMES: A LABORATORY EXPERIMENT
CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Introduction
Joint cost allocation is a pervasive phenomenon in 
accounting practice. Under the generic name of "joint cost 
allocation" there are, in practice, several different joint 
cost contexts. For example, there are the allocation of 
fixed factory overhead and service department costs among 
production departments, the allocation of a joint input cost 
among products which are manufactured using a joint input, 
the allocation of joint facility costs among departments or 
divisions which use a common facility, and the allocation of 
a depreciable asset's service potential over its expected 
service life. This prevalence of joint cost allocation in 
accounting practice has captured the interest of accounting 
researchers and the topic of joint cost allocation has long 
been discussed in the accounting literature.
1
2This project is a study intended to provide some 
empirical evidence on the relative usefulness of two joint 
cost allocation methods: the net realizable value and the
Shapley value allocation schemes, in the context of a 
decision-making situation.
This chapter reviews the existing accounting 
literature concerning joint cost allocations, and describes 
the perceived need which led to the current research. 
Subsequent chapters will describe the research design 
adopted by this study, the statistical analyses of the 
results from the study, and the implications of the 
findings.
Literature Review
Dopuch (1981) has noted that the attitudes of 
accounting researchers regarding joint cost allocations 
appear to have changed over the years. Researchers have 
gone from complete acceptance of joint cost allocations to 
considerable doubts regarding the merits of joint cost 
allocations and now back to justifications and rationales 
for the existance of joint cost allocations. Thomas (1969, 
1971, 1974, 1980) was a leader in the movement to rid the 
world of arbitrary and incorrigible cost allocations. He 
even suggested that major changes in accounting theory would 
be required to escape the allocation problem (Thomas, 1969, 
1974). Kaplan (1977) also asserted that many accountants
3and almost all economists argue that any allocation of joint
costs is arbitrary and serves no useful purpose. Except for
inventory valuation for financial and tax reporting,
government contracting, rate setting, cost documentation for
possible anti-trust suits (e.g., the Robinson-Patman Act),
or cost-plus pricing, the accounting literature went through
a period in which it generally recommends the avoidance of
cost allocations (Zimmerman, 1979). However, it has
recently become apparent that the normative arguments
against cost allocations do not appear consistent with cost
accounting practices. Believing that over time rational
behavior prevails, accounting researchers now question this
inconsistency between normative cost accounting theory and
cost accounting practice. Some accounting scholars have
noted possible benefits from the allocation of costs.
Horngren (1977, p. 508), for example, concludes:
In one organization, allocation may be desirable because 
it induces the desired behavior. In another 
organization, the same allocation procedure may cause an 
opposite behavioral effect.
As we see in the citation above, Horngren conjectures that
managers behave differently if costs are allocated and that
cost allocation is useful when it induces desirable
managerial behavior. Zimmerman (1979) demonstrates that
there are sound reasons for the practice of cost allocation
by providing some concrete examples and sufficient
conditions which support Horngren's conjecture. Zimmerman
4argues that by charging for joint services a firm may reduce
the slack in a manager's budget, leading to a reduction in
discretionary consumption in other areas. Moriarity (1981,
pp. 8-10) also suggests that usefulness for managerial
decisions may be the ultimate rationale for allocations:
. . . if we determine they (cost allocations) are 
useful, then the identification of what we are trying to 
accomplish may provide us with guidance on how we should 
go about allocating costs. . . .
. . .  It seems to me that a convincing rationale (for 
cost allocations) will need to state that allocations 
provide information useful for making managerial 
decisions. . . .
. . .  I believe if we are going to justify our 
effort, we must identify situations in which allocations 
are in fact useful for managerial decisions.
Moriarity suggests two situations in which cost allocations
may be potentially beneficial to decision makers ; one
situation in which cost allocations will signal optimal
capacity adjustments and another in which cost allocations
will signal the relative profitability of products.
While relatively little work has been devoted to 
justifying allocations, there is a large literature devoted 
to methods of allocation. The majority of accountants who 
support allocation favor allocations in proportion to some 
measure of the relative revenue-generating power 
identifiable with individual products. The most popular 
measure that results in a cost indicative of revenue- 
generating power is some approximation of net realizable 
value. Net realizable value is commonly defined as the 
predicted selling price in the ordinary course of business
5less reasonably predictable costs of completion and
disposal. Thomas (1974, p. 44) maintains that the net
realizable value allocation is sterilized with respect to
further-processing decisions. He explains the sterilized
character of the net realizable value allocation as follows;
Further-processing decisions should be made by referring 
to the (unallocated) net realizable values of each 
product. But if one insists upon referring, instead, to 
allocated book gross profits, the allocations may be 
sterilized by making sure that they result in book gross 
profits that have the same algebraic signs as the 
related net realizable values (positive whenever the 
latter are positive, zero or negative otherwise).
Another approach to the question of how to allocate 
joint costs can be found in the area of game theory.
Several game-theoretic schemes for allocating joint costs 
have recently been described in the accounting literature. 
They are generally applications of the Shapley (1953) value 
of a game to the allocation of joint costs in a multi- 
division firm. Essentially, what Shapley does is to define 
a unique division of joint rewards from a cooperative n- 
person game. The conceptual basis for Shapley's scheme is 
that participants in a game can improve their payoffs by 
entering into coalitions with other players. All possible 
coalitions are then considered, weighted by the likelihood 
they would be formed, in apportioning the joint rewards. In 
the cost allocation context, this approach determines the 
incremental costs to each user of a joint facility in such a 
way as to have the sum of those costs equal the full cost of
6providing the common service. Given that increasing 
external cost economies are present, the result is that the 
charge (i.e., the allocated incremental cost) to users is 
less than the costs they would incur if they provided the 
service to themselves individually or as members of 
subcoalitions. Scholars call this result a "core solution" 
and they say that this allocation lies in the core. The 
special appeal of the Shapley scheme, as applied to the 
accountant's allocation problem, is that it provides for an 
equitable sharing of cost externalities arising from the 
jointness of production.
Shubik (1962) was the first to apply the Shapley 
scheme specifically to cost allocations. Using the Shapley 
axioms, he defined a sharing formula on the firm's profits, 
net of joint costs, and then used the resulting profit 
allocation to impute an allocation of joint costs.
Similar to Shubik, Loehman and Whinston (1971,
1974) used an axiomatic approach to derive an allocation of 
costs in a more decentralized setting. They differ from 
Shubik in that they defined their charge formula over 
incremental costs rather than over profits. They considered 
the problem of allocating a joint cost resulting from a 
group of collaborators agreeing to share a common facility, 
where each collaborator has a fixed positive demand. They 
proposed five axioms which supposedly characterize an 
equitable distribution of the joint cost. Acceptance of
7these five axioms as an allocation constitution results in 
the definition of a unique allocation scheme Known as the 
Shapley value.
Jensen (1977) examined the situation where users 
with fixed demands must share a joint facility's cost. If 
the users find the five Loehman-Whinston axioms mutually 
satisfactory, then the Shapley value will allocate the costs 
accordingly. Jensen also showed that the Shapley value 
satisfies the five advantages that Moriarity (1975) listed 
for his allocation scheme. Finally, Jensen presented some 
computationally simplified forms of the Shapley value for 
certain specialized joint cost allocation settings.
Hamlen, Hamlen, and Tschirhart (1977) used the 
criterion of neutrality to evaluate four allocation schemes. 
They argued that core allocation schemes are neutral and 
showed that the activity level scheme, the Shapley value, 
and the nucleolus scheme are core solutions in the context 
of a decreasing marginal cost function. They also showed 
that the Moriarity allocation scheme (1975) does not 
necessarily lie in the core and hence can lead to suboptimal 
solutions. Later, Hamlen et al. (1980) proposed the use of 
a generalized Shapley value which allows the correction of 
two possible weaknesses of the simple Shapley value. The 
first weakness they identified is that the simple Shapley 
value is a unique solution and does not allow the 
flexibility that management often needs. Secondly, there
8are some situations in which the simple Shapley value does 
not lie in the core, even when it is in the best interests 
of the firm for all parties concerned to cooperate.
Callen (1978) argued that financial cost 
allocations can be rendered nonarbitrary by acceptance of a 
constitution of axioms which lead to the Shapley value. He 
viewed "players" as assets and coalitions as firms. Given 
this definition, and acceptance by financial statement users 
and accountants of the aforementioned constitution, then a 
unique, defensible, nonarbitrary allocation of depreciation 
results.
Roth and Verrecchia (1979) suggested that the 
Shapley value may be viewed as a costless surrogate for the 
bargaining process. That is, firms could allow managers of 
subunits to meet and bargain among themselves in order to 
determine the amount of services to provide and how the 
costs should be shared. Avoidance of the cost of this 
negotiation process may be why f<rms establish mutually 
satisfactory allocation schemes. They proved a theorem 
which states that the Shapley value is the certainty 
equivalent of the bargaining process if, and only if, 
managers display ordinary risk neutrality and strategic risk 
neutrality (i.e., they perceive themselves as having equal 
bargaining positions). In effect, given the two 
assumption^", managers would be indifferent between receiving 
the Shapley value and bargaining to receive an uncertain
9allocation.
Verrecchia (1982) presented a possible practical 
application of the Shapley value. The setting examined is 
concerned with an allocation of corporate state and local 
income and franchise taxes in a manner mutually agreeable to 
a large defense contractor and the U.S. government. Each 
party was suggesting an allocation scheme favorable to 
themselves and unfavorable to the other. Verrecchia 
advocated the use of the Shapley value to resolve the 
dispute citing the equity properties of the method.
While the Shapley value has many proponents, it 
also has detractors. Thomas (1980) compared the Shapley 
value with a specially concocted allocation scheme in a 
joint cost setting. The comparison was based on multiple 
criteria extracted from the accounting literature. The 
criteria correspond to certain desirable operating 
properties of an allocation scheme. Based on his analysis, 
he concluded that the specially concocted allocation scheme 
is superior to the Shapley value. And, since the special 
allocation scheme was constructed to be deliberately absurd, 
he stated that accounting researchers may have been overly 
enthusiastic for Shapley allocations.
Hughes and Scheiner (1980) assumed that the users 
of a joint facility are divisions. They further assumed 
that the demands of the users are not fixed. Then, in a 
two-divisional setting, they proceeded to demonstrate that
10
the Shapley allocation of a common cost will not be neutral, 
i.e., suboptimal actions will be taken by the divisions.
They also demonstrated that any full cost allocation scheme 
would lead to suboptimal behavior. They concluded that the 
core criterion for an allocation scheme is not a sufficient 
condition for neutrality.
It is on the basis of equity that the Shapley value 
derives its main appeal. Thomas (1980), however, rejects 
the notion of equity as a sufficient condition for a 
justifiable allocation scheme. He has argued that even 
though individuals affected by a joint cost allocation may 
agree that the Shapley axioms are equitable in nature, they 
may be dissatisfied when the actual allocation is received. 
Joint users often have conflicting interests and they may 
implicitly feel that they could have done better if they had 
been allowed to pursue their own interests, e.g., through a 
bargaining process. While Roth and Verrecchia (1979) showed 
that strategic risk neutrality leads to the Shapley value 
being the certainty equivalent of the bargaining process, it 
is doubtful that many allocation settings would find players 
viewing themselves as having equal bargaining positions. 
Consequently, in most situations players would not be 
willing to accept the Shapley value in lieu of negotiating a 
mutually acceptable allocation. In this situation it 
appears necessary for players to negotiate the share of the 
payoff to be earned from the jointness.
11
There are a number of social psychological models 
of coalition behavior which seem relevant to the allocation 
problem. These models predict how coalitions will form and, 
additionally, predict how the payoffs will be distributed 
among the players in the coalition. The term coalition may 
be defined as the joint use of resources to determine the 
outcome of a decision in a mixed-motive situation involving 
two or more individuals (Gamson, 1964). Gamson (1964, p.
85) explains the mixed-motive situation:
. . . each participant wishes to maximize his or her 
relative influence over the outcome of the decision. 
Since this can only be done at the expense of others, 
the reconciliation of disagreements could be considered 
a mixed-motive situation.
Two social psychological models of coalition 
formation seem to be particularly important in the problem 
of joint cost allocation: minimum resource theory and
bargaining theory.
Minimum resource theory emphasizes the initial 
resources which the players bring to the situation rather 
than their strategic bargaining position. Gamson (1961) 
made the connection between the relative strength of members 
of a coalition and the distribution of rewards more 
explicit. He suggested that "any participant will expect 
others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff 
proportional to the amount of resources which they 
contribute to a coalition." Gamson (1964, p. 88) also 
states :
12
This (The parity norm) is the belief by the participants 
that a person ought to get from an agreement an amount 
proportional to what he brings into it. It is important 
to note that this is not an assessment of relative power 
in the situation, but a statement of what the players 
feel they deserve. It is a normative belief, not a 
perception of bargaining advantage.
Boatsman, Hansen, and Kimbrell (1981) proposed a 
minimum resource allocation scheme as an alternative to the 
Shapley value allocation. Their consideration is that an 
allocation scheme must be equitable in the sense that it 
reflects the relative needs or relative contributions of the 
individual recipients. They maintained that the minimum 
resource allocation scheme is essentially equivalent to the 
widely used activity level allocation scheme and that it is 
a suitable surrogate for the bargaining process. They 
empirically investigated how the ownership of merged firms 
are divided between the shareholders of the acquiring and 
acquired firms. Their empirical test provided some evidence 
which suggests that the minimum resource allocation scheme 
describes the behavior of real world negotiants.
Bargaining theory (Komorita and ChertKoff, 1973) 
assumes that the division of the payoff within a coalition 
will be a compromise between two conflicting norms. A 
coalition member who is weak in resources will advocate that 
the payoff be divided according to a norm of equality, that 
is, the payoff should be divided equally, while a member who 
is strong in resources will argue for a division of the 
payoff according to the parity norm. In fact, the
13
prediction for the initial trial is that the players will 
expect their rewards to be midway between the predictions of 
the parity norm and those of the equality norm.
The major difference among the Shapley value 
allocation, the minimum resource allocation, and the 
bargaining theory allocation is in their division of the 
payoff within a coalition. The Shapley value allocation 
divides the payoff equally based on the assumption that 
players have equal bargaining positions (the equality norm). 
The minimum resource allocation distributes the payoff in 
proportion to the amount of resources which players 
contribute to a coalition (the parity norm). The bargaining 
theory allocation divides the payoff based on a compromise 
between the two conflicting norms. That is, the players' 
rewards are midway between the predictions of the parity 
norm and those of the equality norm.
There is another allocation scheme similar to the 
minimum resource allocation scheme. Moriarity (1975) 
suggested an allocation scheme which divides the payoff in 
proportion to independent costs (i.e., the costs of 
obtaining services independently). It was observed that 
this allocation basis does not require any additional data 
beyond that necessary to calculate the cost savings to a 
coalition and also that it allocates in a manner that does 
not possess several dysfunctional aspects of the then 
existing allocation procedures.
14
Gangolly (1981) has developed an alternative scheme 
for the allocation of joint costs which uses the same equity 
principle as the Moriarity scheme, that is, sharing of cost 
savings in proportion to independent costs. He proposed the 
"Independent Cost Proportional Scheme (ICPS)" which yields 
core allocations when there are three or more cost centers 
and the marginal costs are nonincreasing. The ICPS thus 
preserves both core membership and Moriarity's principle of 
proportional equity. The ICPS satisfies substantially the 
same properties as the Shapley value allocation scheme 
except for "invariance under strategic equivalence." Since 
the ICPS is not invariant, it depends in a crucial manner on 
the aggregation of costs by an accounting system.
As this review indicates, the accounting literature 
contains various arguments claiming that some allocation 
procedures are, in some sense, better than others. Various 
schemes have been both supported and questioned. However, 
the arguments are normative in nature and there is virtually 
no empirical work to evaluate the competing allocation 
schemes. The present study was undertaken in an attempt to 
empirically evaluate two of the normative allocation schemes 
which have been proposed.
The Need For This Research
Because accounting is a pragmatic discipline, it 
can be justified only in terms of its usefulness in the real
15
world. Therefore, various accounting concepts and
procedures must relate to real world phenomena and behavior.
This relationship between real world phenomena, behavior and
various accounting concepts and procedures can only be
determined by empirical research. The 1972 AAA Committee on
Research Methodology in Accounting (1972, pp. 440-441)
addresses the importance of empirical studies as follows:
Empirical studies that are well designed to test limited 
and clearly stated hypotheses should facilitate and 
encourage additional studies to substantiate as well as 
build on the earlier work. It is reasonable to 
anticipate that this approach will enable accounting 
research to progress slowly but surely in the direction 
of developing and testing an increasing range of 
hypotheses. Verified (or rejected) hypotheses should, 
in turn, provide the basis for validating theoretical 
statements concerning the nature and consequences of 
various accounting practices. . , .
, . . Thus, each properly conducted and properly 
reported investigation, as well as each effort to 
reconcile conflicting findings, make an incremental 
contribution to the development of a solid body of 
knowledge about accounting.
In line with the developing emphasis on empirical
research, this study tries to provide some empirical
evidence on the relative usefulness of the net realizable
value and the Shapley value allocation methods. The long-
run intent is to help resolve the conflicting normative
arguments being made about those procedures.
Purpose Of The Study 
Among the various allocation procedures reviewed, 
the net realizable value and the Shapley value allocations 
appear to have been the most widely discussed in accounting
16
text books and in the accounting literature. The net 
realizable value allocation scheme has been the most popular 
method of allocating joint costs in accounting text books. 
Thomas (1974, p. 168) addresses some advantages of the net 
realizable value approach. He maintains that the net 
realizable value approach is mechanically simple and it is 
fair in the sense that it allocates joint costs in 
proportion to each product's ability to bear the costs. He 
also maintains that it does not affect further-processing 
decisions. In the recent accounting literature, however, a 
game-theoretic approach, specifically the Shapley value 
allocation scheme, has earned popularity among several 
accounting scholars. These accounting researchers find the 
special appeal of the Shapley value allocation scheme to be 
that it lies in the core and it provides for an equitable 
sharing of cost externali ties arising from the jointness of 
production.
In reviewing these two schemes a question naturally 
arises: Which allocation procedure (the net realizable
value or the Shapley value allocation) is "better"? In 
order to answer this question we must operationalize the 
criteria "better". In the belief that the ultimate 
rationale for cost allocations may be their usefulness for 
managerial decisions, the two allocation schemes were 
compared in a specific decision situation.
A second criterion for the term better was
17
developed from Jensen's work. As stated earlier, there are 
several different situations in which joint costs are 
allocated. This study will focus on a situation in which a 
joint facility is used by decentralized divisions. In that 
situation mutually satisfactory allocations are agreements 
among collaborators to share the joint facility cost 
(Jensen, 1977; Thomas, 1971, 1974). Such agreements may be 
negotiated by collaborators with the assistance of 
accountants and other outsiders. Jensen (1977), for 
example, suggested that accountants may assist the 
negotiation of cost-sharing arrangements by providing 
formulas that possess characteristics desired by the 
collaborators. Jensen views the accountants' role as 
varying according to the degree to which formulas displace 
the bargaining behavior of collaborators. In some cases, 
accountants are completely absent from the negotiation 
process and mutually satisfactory allocations are strictly 
the outcome of bargaining among the collaborators. In other 
cases, accountants may be impowered to impose an allocation 
result and users of the joint facility are compelled to 
accept it. Jensen called this allocation an "imposed 
allocation" (Jensen, 1980). Imposed allocations are often 
recommended based on the consideration that they may 
increase the benefits to collaborators by avoiding costly 
negotiations and by securing an optimal use of facilities 
that negotiators may be unable to reach.
18
The purpose of this study is to provide some 
empirical evidence on the relative usefulness of two imposed 
allocation schemes by empirically evaluating the two 
allocation schemes with regard to; (1) their effects on 
divisional managers' pricing decisions and therefore on 
divisional profits and a firm's overall profit, and (2) 
their effects on divisional managers' perceived fairness of 
the cost allocations and on their decision of whether they 
wish to collaborate in using the joint facility.
Design Of The Studv
This study uses a laboratory experiment simulating 
the pricing decision for two divisional managers. The two 
managers (the Division 1 manager and the Division 2 manager) 
operate in independent markets but use a common resource.
The experiment is intended to demonstrate whether different 
allocation procedures lead to different operating decisions.
Summary
This chapter has reviewed the current literature on 
joint cost allocations and described the value which an 
empirical study might provide to help resolve the 
conflicting normative arguments about joint cost allocation 
procedures. The next chapter examines some alternative 
approaches which might have been taken and summarizes the 
reasons why an experimental approach was chosen.
CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Introduction
The 1973 AAA Committee on Internal Measurement and 
Reporting (1973, pp. 215-216) describes several difficulties 
in choosing between the methods available for testing 
hypotheses in the area of internal measurement and reporting 
as follows:
First, the 1970-71 AAA Committee on Research 
Methodology in Accounting came to the conclusion that 
"the methods appropriate for research in accounting can 
be stated quite simply: All methods are appropriate."
As a result, no list of appropriate accounting research 
methods was forthcoming. Instead, each committee member 
wrote on a research method reflecting his interests and 
beliefs in the importance of the topic. No effort was 
made to compile an exhaustive list of methods.
Second, the appropriateness of a research method 
cannot be evaluated without placing it within the 
context of the research question. . . . Although 
specific context is necessary for evaluation of a 
particular research method. Knowledge of the general 
field of inquiry should be sufficient for identification 
of potential research methods.
Third, before a list of methods can be prepared, 
some definitional groundwork must be done to delineate 
what is meant by various terms. Do methods include only 
those techniques for gathering data? Is data analysis a 
research method? Or does a research method encompass 
the entire research framework from having an idea to 
final data analysis?
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This study defines research methodology narrowly as 
the methods for gathering data.
Alternative Methodologies 
The 1973 AAA Committee on Internal Measurement and 
Reporting (1973, pp. 219-225) has divided methodologies into 
three basic areas: Historical, Experimental, and Field
Study approach. The following is an examination on some of 
the major advantages (strengths) and disadvantages 
(weaknesses) of the research methodologies based on the 
Committee report.
Historical Approach 
The historical approach relies primarily on 
document examination. Document examination includes the 
gathering of data from libraries, financial statements, 
company records, data banks, etc.
The major advantages of this approach include:
(1) Document examination is relatively cheaper than 
setting up and completing an experiment or a field 
study.
(2) A change in events over time can be studied 
retrospectively.
The major disadvantages of this approach include:
(1) Previously documented events have been subjected 
to at least one "filter" by the original observer.
(2) Data may not exist which allows the study of the
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research problem.
(3) Data must be accepted as is and may not allow 
additional "in-depth" examination.
Experimental Approach 
Experimental data are generated when the researcher 
designs a controlled situation to test a specific 
hypothesis, manipulates at least one of the variables, and 
measures the reaction of the uncontrolled (dependent) 
variables. The experimental approach can be further divided 
into three areas: laboratory, field, and simulation
methods.
Laboratory experiment. The laboratory experimental 
design generally attempts to control or Keep the variance of 
all or nearly all of the possible influential independent 
variables not pertinent to the problem at a minimum.
The major advantages of this approach include:
(1) The laboratory environment facilitates control of 
the variables by eliminating extraneous and, 
perhaps, otherwise uncontrollable influences.
(2) It allows manipulation of variables.
(3) Random assignment is possible allowing statistical 
inference.
(4) Relatively precise observations or measurements 
are possible.
The major disadvantages of this approach include:
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(1) Because of the artificial nature of the laboratory 
situation subjects' motivations may be different 
from those encountered in real situations.
(2) It is usually difficult to generalize the results. 
That is, the results may not extrapolate beyond 
the laboratory.
(3) It is usually difficult to design a good 
experiment.
Field experiment. Field experiments include those 
research studies conducted in a field setting in which one 
or more independent variables are manipulated by the 
experimenter under as carefully controlled conditions as the 
situation will permit.
The major advantages of this approach include:
(1) It allows manipulation of variables.
(2) Random assignment is possible allowing statistical 
inference.
(3) Since it is conducted in a lifelike setting 
variables usually have greater realism than in a 
laboratory situation.
The major disadvantages of this approach include:
(1) The researcher may not be able to manipulate 
important variables due to practical constraints.
(2) In a lifelike setting it may be difficult to 
assign subjects randomly to treatments.
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(3) The research may need to be justified to the
people being examined, thus losing the objectivity 
of the participants.
Simulation. Simulation involves the creation of an 
operating model of a system (persons, firms, or economies) 
and experimenting on this representation by manipulating its 
variables and their interrelationships. Developing the 
model used in the simulation involves the isolation of those 
variables in the system which are hypothesized as pertinent 
to the problem.
The major advantages of this approach include:
(1) It allows the study of complex internal 
interactions of a system.
(2) It allows experimentation with new situations 
about which we have little or no information.
(3) It allows examination and prediction in those 
situations which are infeasible or too costly to 
examine otherwise.
(4) It allows sensitivity analysis of the system.
The major disadvantages of this approach include:
(1) All aspects of the system must be rigorously 
specified prior to creation of the model to avoid 
subsequent costly revisions.
(2) Validation of model parameters may be difficult 
or impossible. This leads to results which are
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suspect.
(3) The technique may not be easily interpreted or 
understood by many of the people using the 
results.
Field Study Approach 
A field study involves "ex post facto" scientific 
inquiries aimed at discovering the relations and 
interactions of variables in real situations. Field studies 
may be either exploratory, trying to discover "what is," or 
hypothesis testing, trying to predict relationships.
The major advantages of this approach include:
(1) Since field studies are conducted in a more 
realistic environment, external validity and the 
practical significance of the results are high
(Abdel-KhaliK and Ajinkya, 1979, p. 45).
(2) A large number of variables and their interactions 
in a complex setting can be investigated.
The major disadvantages of this approach include:
(1) Control is difficult and variables cannot be 
manipulated.
(2) The low level of control makes it very difficult 
to draw causal inferences (Abdel-khalik and 
Ajinkya, 1979, p. 45).
(3) It usually takes a relatively large amount of time 
and money to collect the data.
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Laboratory Experiment For The Studv
This study intends to empirically evaluate the net 
realizable value allocation and the Shapley value allocation 
methods in a decision situation. Since there is no 
available information about the effect of different cost 
allocation methods on managers' decisions, a historical 
approach cannot be used. There are two alternative 
approaches remaining. One is an experimental approach and 
the other is a field study approach. This study did not 
adopt a field study approach because it seemed unlikely that 
a sufficient number of appropriate real situations could be 
formed. That is, it would be necessary to locate several 
situations in which two divisional managers use a common 
facility and the joint cost in some cases is divided based 
on the net realizable value allocation method while in 
others the Shapley value allocation method is used. Thus, 
an experimental approach seemed to be the only viable 
methodology left for this study.
As stated earlier, there are three different 
methods in an experimental approach; using a laboratory 
experiment, a field experiment, or simulation. The 
simulation method was not adopted in this study because it 
seemed important that hypotheses concerning the activities 
of individuals should be tested by analyzing the behavior of 
real-life subjects. Moreover, even sophisticated simulation 
techniques cannot completely capture all of the factors that
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encompass the decision process of actual decision makers. 
Because the simulator, or researcher, may overlook some 
factors, the simulations must also be tested against the 
actions of real decision makers. Consequently, the ultimate 
test of hypothesized behavior is observed behavior.
The remaining alternatives are a laboratory 
experiment and a field experiment. This study did not 
select a field experiment because it is too costly and 
difficult to construct a field setting. Therefore, a 
laboratory experiment was adopted in this study.
Summarv
This chapter has defined research methodology as a 
method for gathering data. It described several alternative 
methodologies with their strengths and weaknesses. Then, 
the reason why this study adopted a laboratory experiment as 
its methodology was stated.
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Introduction 
This chapter presents the specific questions 
addressed in this study. The questions are addressed in 
terms of the null hypotheses to be tested. Then, the 
decision situation chosen for this study is described.
Based on the setting a series of experiments were designed 
and conducted to generate the data that will be used in 
testing the hypotheses. Finally, the statistical techniques 
used in this study to analyze the data obtained from the 
experiment are explained.
Research Questions And Hypotheses 
As stated in Chapter I, this study intends to 
provide some empirical evidence on the relative usefulness 
of the net realizable value and the Shapley value allocation 
schemes by empirically evaluating the two schemes in a two- 
divisional pricing decision situation. A pricing decision 
situation was chosen to evaluate the two schemes because
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cost-based pricing is one of the major uses of allocations. 
Allocations for cost-based pricing are frequently made in 
practice according to a recent study by Fremgen and Liao 
(1981, pp. 64-66). Their study shows that 66 out of the 108 
companies that responded to their survey were allocating 
corporate common costs for purposes of setting cost-based 
prices. In order to evaluate the two allocation schemes, 
this study addresses the following questions:
(Research question 1)
Do the two allocation schemes affect divisional 
managers' pricing decisions differently and therefore render 
different divisional and overall net incomes (in this study 
"overall net income" is defined as the sum of the two 
divisional net incomes)? If they do, which allocation 
scheme leads to prices that render net incomes closer to the 
optimal net incomes?
(Research question 2)
Do the two allocation schemes differ in their effect on 
the divisional managers' ability to adjust prices when 
demand changes? If they do, which allocation scheme allows 
them to approach optimal prices more closely?
(Research question 3)
Do the two allocation schemes differ in terms of their 
perceived fairness in the division of joint cost? If they
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do, which allocation scheme do divisional managers feel is 
more fair?
(Research question 4)
Do the two allocation schemes differ in encouraging 
divisional managers to cooperate in using the joint 
facility? If they do, which allocation scheme encourages 
cooperation more?
These questions will be addressed in terms of the 
following null hypotheses to be tested in a two-divisional 
setting,
(Hypotheses for research question 1)
H(1): There is no significant difference in the pricing 
performance of the Division 1 managers under the 
two allocation schemes.
H(2): There is no significant difference in the pricing 
performance of the Division 2 managers under the 
two allocation schemes,
H(3); There is no significant difference in the overall 
net incomes reached by the participants using the 
two allocation schemes,
(Hypotheses for research question 2)
H(4): There is no significant difference in the pricing 
performance of the Division 1 managers under the 
two allocation schemes when the market demand
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function changes.
H(5): There is no significant difference in the pricing 
performance of the Division 2 managers under the 
two allocation schemes when the market demand 
function changes.
H(6); There is no significant difference in the overall 
net incomes reached by the participants under the 
two allocation schemes when the market demand 
function changes.
(Hypotheses for research question 3)
H(7): There is no significant difference in the managers' 
combined perceived level of fairness concerning the 
allocation of the joint cost under the two 
allocation schemes.
H(8); There is no significant difference in the level of 
disparity in the fairness perception between the 
divisional managers concerning the allocation of 
the joint cost under the two allocation schemes.
(Hypothesis for research question 4)
H(9); There is no significant difference in the
proportion of managers desiring to continue the 
use of the joint facility under the two 
allocation schemes.
The Experimental Setting
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In order to evaluate the two joint cost allocation 
schemes a specific situation which is appropriate for the 
evaluation was needed. The hypothetical situation chosen is 
a copy shop. A copy shop was chosen in part because it 
involves a relatively simple situation. That is, a copy 
shop performs copying service upon receiving customers' 
orders and as a result, it does not have significant 
inventories of product during the accounting period. In 
addition, the major cost of operating such a shop is the 
rental of the copier. Further, real data on copier rentals 
was readily available from the manufacturers which allowed 
me to build some external validity into the situation. 
Finally, choosing a copy shop also provides the advantage 
that the subjects (students) should be fairly familiar with 
the workings of a copy shop.
The manager of each copy shop was given the 
objective of maximizing immediate, short-run profit. The 
business consists of two divisions.*
Divisional managers were given profit responsibility; that 
is, they were told that they would be evaluated on the basis 
of the amount of profit their division earned during an 
accounting period. Therefore, the managers should desire to 
maximize their divisions' immediate, short-run profits.
*The term "profit center" would be more 
appropriate, but it was felt that the experimental subjects 
would better understand the term "division."
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Managers were given the autonomy to set their own selling 
price. The price, in turn, was used along with a demand 
function to determine the amount of copying services 
performed. Income statements were prepared at the end of 
each period. It was assumed that the market was clearly 
segmented for the two divisions. Due to this market 
segmentation, divisional managers did not compete against 
each other for customers.
Each division's net income was calculated by 
subtracting its total cost from total revenue during a 
period. Total revenue was the product of the selling price 
and the quantity sold. The quantity sold was a function 
only of the selling price. Algebraically this relationship 
can be presented by a demand function X = f(P), where X is 
the quantity sold and P is the selling price. In the 
experiment, each division faced two different demand 
situations (functions). That is, one demand function held 
for Periods 1-13 for each division and the demand function 
changed at the end of Period 13 into a different demand 
function for Periods 14-19 for each division. Specifically,
2 .  5
Division 1 faced a demand function X = 170/P for Periods
3 3
1-13 and a changed demand function X = 16/P ' for Periods
14-19, whereas Division 2 encountered a demand function X =
2 2
500/P ■ for Periods 1-13 and a changed demand function X = 
, 1 . 8
1625/P for Periods 14-19. Demand functions for the two 
divisions are shown in table 1 as follows:
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TABLE 1
DEMAND FUNCTIONS (DETERMINISTIC)
Periods 1-13 Periods 14-19
Division 1 X=l70/pZ'S X=16/P^*^
Division 2 X=500/P^^ X=1625/P^*®
These demand functions were arbitrarily selected, but they 
were constructed to yield the following characteristics. 
First, the demand functions should be continuous functions 
of the selling price and they should not exhibit breaks or 
kinks in response to small alterations in the selling price. 
Instead, I wanted the response to small changes in the 
celling price to be smooth and continuous. Second, they 
should present a reasonable economic relationship between 
price and quantity. That is, demand should increase when 
price falls, whereas demand should decrease when the price 
becomes higher. Finally, they should be fairly realistic 
for a copy shop business. For example, the selling price 
and the quantity sold as determined by the functions should 
approximately reflect a reasonable copy shop operation.
In the hypothetical situation the total cost of 
each division was determined by the quantity of copies sold 
and the prices of the inputs hired. For simplicity, I 
assumed that each division's costs consisted of only the 
salary for one employee, the rent on the shop, and the use
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of utilities (mainly electricity). In addition to these 
input factors, it was assumed that each manager rented a 
different copier. In particular, the copier used by 
Division 2 is of a more advanced model than that used in 
Division 1.
During the experiment at Period 9, central 
management (the experimenter) told the two managers to 
jointly use a copier which is more advanced and bigger than 
the two copiers they were using independently. The two 
managers were told that the use of the common copier would 
result in lower costs.
Table 2 shows the two divisions' cost functions in 
the case where they each rent and use a separate copier.
When they rent and use a copier jointly, the costs would 
appear as shown in table 3. These
cost functions were constructed based on both some real data 
and some assumed data. That is, the copier rental costs 
were the real costs available from the Xerox Corporation 
during the fall of 1982, but the other cost items were 
arbitrarily selected. The amounts were chosen in an attempt 
to be representative of a copy shop business and to maintain 
linear cost functions to make the problem simple. The cost 
functions shown in tables 2 and 3 remained unchanged 
throughout the experiment.
Given the demand functions (on page 33) and the 
cost functions (on pages 35-36), it is possible to calculate
TABLE 2
COST FUNCTIONS 
(INDEPENDENT USE OF THE COPIER)
Division 1 Division 2
Copier
rental
Quantity sold Rental cost ($) Quantity sold Rental cost ($)
0 < X, < 100,000 2,015 0<X*< 300,000 3,885 -
100,000<X,1250,000 2,015+(X,-100,000;%.0092 300,000<Xi<500,000 3,885+(X»-300,000)x.0087
250,000 <X, 2,015+(150,000)X.0092+ 
(X,-250,000) X.0084
500,000<Xi 3,885+(200,000)x.0087+
(X*-500,000)x.0060
Shop
rental
$ 500 $ 600
Salary $ 600 $ 700
Utilities $ 300 $ 400
Materials $ .0306 X, $ .0306 Xj,
Note: X| and show the quantity sold in number of copies for Division 1 and Division 2
respectively.
OJ
TABLE 3
COST FUNCTIONS 
(JOINT USE OF THE COPIER)
Joint cost
Joint copier 
rental
Quantity sold Joint rental cost ($)
0 < X  <300,000 5,600
300,000 < X <  700,000 5,600+(X-300,000)%.0080
700,000 < X 5,600+(400,000) x.0080+(X-700,000)x.0040
Independent cost
Division 1 Division 2
Shop
rental
$ 500 $ 600
Salary $ 600 $ 700
Utilities $ 300 $ 400
Materials $ .0306 X $ .0306 X
Note: X represents total quantity sold in number of copies for Division 1 and Division 2
combined, i.e., X = X , + X^ .
CO
CJ>
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the optimal price and net income using the traditional 
microeconomic profit maximization model by equating marginal 
revenue and marginal cost. The optimal prices and net 
incomes are calculated in Appendix A. The optimal values 
computed appear in table 4.
TABLE 4
THE OPTIMAL PRICES AND NET INCOMES (DETERMINISTIC)
Periods
1-8
Periods
9-13
Periods
14-19
Division 1
Price $ .066333 $ .064333 $ .055383
Net income $1,485.25 N:$1,381.30* 
S:$1,786.81*
N:$1,177.55* 
S:$1,497.48*
Division 2
Price $ .0561 $ .070767 $ .08685
Net income $1,622.62 N:$1,940.42* 
S:$1,534.91*
N:$2,664.40* 
S:$2,344.47*
Overal1 ne1; income $3,107.87 $3,321.72 $3,841.95
♦ The optimal net income for each division will vary 
depending on how the joint cost is allocated between 
the two divisions. N stands for the net realizable 
value allocation and S, for the Shapley value allocation.
The optimal values presented in table 4 are based 
on deterministic demand and cost functions. In the demand 
functions (on page 33) the quantity sold (X) is a 
deterministic function of the selling price (P). In 
reality, however, the quantity sold cannot be predicted with 
certainty. Instead there will be some fluctuation in
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demand. I constructed probabilistic demand functions for 
this study because they are realistic and they also prevent 
the experimental task from being a trivial exercise for the 
subjects.
In order to construct the probabilistic demand 
function I added a normally distributed error term with a 
zero mean value to the deterministic demand function. The 
revised demand function then is X = f(P) + E , where E is a 
normally distributed random number. In this function E 
shows the extent of random fluctuation around f(P) and 
therefore, E could be shown as a percentage of f(P).
Denoting M as the mean, S as the standard deviation, and R 
as the normalized value, respectively of E, E can be 
presented as follows:
E = R X S ( •.• R = (E - M)/S and M = 0)
Thus, S could also be shown as a percentage of f(P), i.e.,
S = c X f(P), where c is a coefficient showing the 
percentage. Then, the revised probabilistic demand function 
can be presented as follows:
X = f(P) + R X c X f(P)
In order to determine the probabilistic demand function the 
level of c had to be determined. In the probabilistic 
demand function two identical selling prices could be 
associated with different values for the quantity sold and, 
as a result, different values for net income. In this 
situation there is a probability that a divisional manager
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making a pricing decision revises a prior price in the wrong 
direction. In other words, the random fluctuation distorts 
the manager's prediction and consequently it might lead the 
manager to an erroneous decision. If the extent of 
distortion is designated too high, the random factor will 
overshadow the pricing effect on net income. On the other 
hand, if the extent of distortion is designated too low, the 
random factor is virtually ignored and the managers' search 
for the optimal price will be too simple and trivial.
In order to determine the level of c, 1,000 pairs 
of net incomes were calculated (each pair consisted of two 
net incomes; one was a net income yielded by a quantity 
demanded at the optimal price and the other was a net income 
rendered by a quantity demanded at a price close to the 
optimal price). Then, the two net incomes in each pair were 
compared. This procedure was continued with different 
levels of c until about 100 pairs (10%) of the pairs yielded 
a net income associated with the optimal price which was 
smaller than the other net income.
In figure 1, with a normally distributed random 
factor, the divisional manager would obtain a different net 
income each time he or she sets the identical price, $ ,066. 
The different net incomes determined by the price, $ .066 
forms a normal distribution. In the same manner the 
different net incomes determined by the price, $ .069 forms 
the other normal distribution. The mean values (i.e..
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$1,485.06 and $1,474.26) were chosen such that the 
difference between the two net incomes was approximately ten 
dollars.
FIGURE 1 
TWO NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS
P= .069 P*= .066
1,474.26 1,485.06
where P*= the optimal price
P = a price close to the optimal price 
NI= net incomes
In figure 1, if the two distributions overlap, 
there is a chance that a net income associated with the 
price, $ .066 becomes smaller than a net income associated 
with the price, $ .069. Therefore, the overlapping area 
(shaded area in figure 1) indicates the probability that a 
manager will make an erroneous pricing decision due to the 
random factor. The procedure which was used to generate the 
random factor was intended to keep these erroneous decisions 
to approximately 10% of the decisions. The probabilistic
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demand functions generated are given in table 5,
TABLE 5
DEMAND FUNCTIONS (PROBABILISTIC)
Periods 1-13 Periods 14-19
Division 1 %=170/p2'5
+R(.00137)(170/P )
X=16/P'^
+R( .00210)(16/P 1
Division 2 X=500/P='= „  
+R(.00075)(500/F^)
X=1625/P^*®
+R(.00076)(1625/P^
Note; R represents the normalized value of the random 
number (E) with mean of zero and standard 
deviation of one.
The probabilistic demand functions in table 5, the 
cost functions in tables 2 and 3, and the resulting 
relations between net income and the selling price are 
presented graphically in figures 2, 3, 4, and 5.
. The Experiment 
Using the setting described in the previous 
section, a total of 60 experiments were conducted 
sequentially to generate the data to be used for testing the 
research hypotheses.
Each experiment involved the experimenter and a 
pair of subjects; one subject acting as the Division 1 
manager and the other subject acting as the Division 2 
manager. Each pair of subjects was scheduled to perform the 
experiment at a specific time. The first 30 experiments
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FIGURE 4
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were conducted using the net realizable value allocation 
method (the N method hereafter) and the remaining 30 
experiments were performed using the Shapley value 
allocation method (the S method hereafter). Therefore, in 
total, there were 30 subjects who took the role of the 
Division 1 manager under the N method, another 30 subjects 
acted as the Division 2 manager under the N method, 30 more 
subjects were assigned as the Division 1 manager under the S 
method, and a last 30 subjects represented the Division 2 
manager under the S method.
Since a series of 60 experiments were conducted 
there was the danger that the students who performed the 
experiment early might talk about their experience with 
students who were to perform the experiment later. In order 
to minimize this talk, the instructions stated that there 
were a large number of different experimental environments. 
Hence any comments made to their friends who were to perform 
the experiment later might be misleading. This instruction 
seems to have worked well because when the subjects' pricing 
performance was reviewed, there was no indication of 
systematic "better" performance by the later subjects.
The Experimental Task
In conducting each experiment a set of instructions 
explaining the situation and the subject's task were
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distributed to the subjects. The instructions are shown in 
Appendix B. Each experiment lasted about an hour. In each 
experiment 19 accounting periods were simulated in which the 
subjects had to set a selling price. Their major 
experimental task was to set a selling price at the 
beginning of each period. They initially set a price based 
on their own perception of the situation provided in the 
instructions at the beginning of the experiment. The prices 
decided by the two subjects were then presented to the 
experimenter. The experimenter entered these prices into a 
computer terminal and obtained income statements for each 
division. Then, the income statements were distributed to 
the subjects. The subjects revised their price at the 
beginning of each subsequent period based on the information 
contained in the income statement for the preceding period. 
The computer program for making the income statements when 
the two managers used a different copier independently is 
shown in Appendix C. Appendix D provides another computer 
program for preparing the income statements and the 
comparative information about the two divisions' operations 
when the two divisions used a common copier. In addition to 
the major task, at the end of Period 13 the subjects were 
asked to evaluate the fairness of the joint cost allocation. 
At the end of Period 19 they were asked whether they wished
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to continue using the joint facility and they were again 
asked to evaluate the fairness of the joint cost allocation.
The subjects performed their task under the 
following three situations:
(1) The independent use of a copier (Periods 1-8)
The subjects each used an independent copier. They 
made pricing decisions using the information contained in 
the income statement which was prepared based on the selling 
price they set. An example of the income statement is shown 
in table 6.
The subjects were allowed four practice periods (Periods 
1-4) to become familiar with the experimental task. By 
performing the task in this situation the subjects learned 
to play the game and obtained some knowledge of the demand 
function and the profit potential from using an independent 
copier. The data (net incomes) for Periods 5-8 were used as 
covariates in the statistical analysis for research 
questions 1 and 2.
(2) The joint use of a copier (Periods 9-13)
The subjects were forced to use a joint copier, 
which affected their cost function. But their demand 
function was the same as in the case of the independent use 
of a copier. They again made their pricing decisions using 
the information contained in the income statements provided 
to them. An example of these income statements is shown in.
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TABLE 6
THE INCOME STATEMENTS
(INDEPENDENT USE OF THE COPIER)
MONTHLY INCOME STATEMENT OF DIVISION I (PERIOD 8)
REVENUE:
SALES 146347. COPIES ♦ $0,067 9805.25
EXPENSES:
COPIER RENTAL
SHOP RENTAL
SALARY
UTILITIES
MATERIALS 146347. COPIES * $0.0306
t 2441.39
500.00
600.00 
300.00
4478.22 8319.61
NET INCOME $ 1485.64
m o n t h l y  INCOME STATEMENT OF DIVISION 2 (PERIOD 8>
REVENUE:
SALES 295331. COPIES » $0,055 $ 16243.21
EXPENSES:
COPIER RENTAL
SHOP RENTAL .
SALARY
UTILITIES
MATERIALS 295331. COPIES ♦ $0.0306
i 3883.00 
600.00
700.00
400.00 
9037.13 14622.13
NET INCOME 1621.08
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table 7. The data (net incomes) were used to answer 
research question 1.
At the end of Period 13 the subjects received a 
summary of the operating results for the two divisions. An 
example of this information is shown in table 8. Consulting 
this information and the
explanation given in the instructions about the allocation 
method, they evaluated the fairness of the joint cost 
allocation; that is, they answered a question about how fair 
they felt the allocation of the joint cost was. They were 
also asked to list the reasons for their feelings. Their 
evaluation of the fairness of the allocation was measured on 
a four-point scale and this data was used to answer research 
question 3.
(3) The joint use of a copier in a changed demand situation
(Periods 14-19)
In the last set of trials, the subjects shared the 
joint copier as they did in Periods 9-13. But, in these 
latter trials the demand functions each division faced were 
changed. The task was the same as in Periods 9-13. The 
data (net incomes) from these trials were used to answer 
research question 2.
At the end of Period 19 (the last period) the 
subjects were asked whether they wished to continue using 
the joint copier. They were also asked to explain the
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TABLE 7
THE INCOME STATEMENTS
(JOINT USE OF THE COPIER)
MONTHLY INCOME STATEMENT OF DIVISION 1 (PERIOD 19)
REVENUE:
SALES 243395. COPIES * $0,054 $ 13143.34
EXPENSES:
YOUR SHARE OF COPIER RENTAL $ 3134.21
SHOP RENTAL 500.00
SALARY 600.00
UTILITIES 300.00
MATERIALS 243395. COPIES * *0.0306 7447.89 11982.10
NET INCOME * 1161.23
MONTHLY INCOME STATEMENT OF DIVISION 2 (PERIOD 19)
REVENUE:
SALES 149910. COPIES * $0,081 $ 12142.68
EXPENSES:
YOUR SHARE OF COPIER RENTAL * 3212.22
SHOP RENTAL 600.00
SALARY 700.00
UTILITIES 400.00
MATERIALS 149910. COPIES * $0.0306 4587.23 9499.46
NET INCOME $ 2643.22
TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF THE OPERATING RESULTS FOR THE TWO DIVISIONS
TOTAL DIVISION 1 DIVISION 2
1. COPIER RENTAL
COST CHARGED TO: 6346.44 3134.21 ( 49.4 %) 3212.22 ( 50.6 Z)
2. SALES 25286.02 13143.34 ( 52.0 %} 12142.68 ( 48.0 %)
3. SHOP RENTAL 1100.00 500.00 ( 45.5 %) 600.00 ( 54.5 Z)
4. SALARY 1300.00 600.00 ( 46.2 %) 700.00 ( 53.8 %)
5. UTILITIES 700.00 300.00 ( 42.9 %) 400.00 ( 57.1 Z)
6. MATERIALS 12035.12 7447.89 ( 61.9 %) 4587.23 ( 38.1 Z)
7. NET INCOME 3804.46 1161.23 ( 30.5 Z) 2643.22 ( 69.5 %)
54
8. NUMBER OF COPIES
SOLD 393305.
9. NET INCOME BEFORE 
CHARGE FOR USE OF
COPIER 10150.89
10. COST IF EACH 
DIVISION USED A 
SEPARATE COPIER 7219.23
11. COST SAVINGS 
(LINE 10 MINUS
LINE 1) 872.80
243395. ( 61.9 %)
4295.45 ( 42.3 %)
3334.23 ( 46.2 %)
200.02 ( 22.9%)
149910. ( 38.1 %)
5855.45 ( 57.7 %)
3885.00 ( 53.8 %)
672.78 ( 77.1%)
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reasons for their choice. The subjects' responses (yes or 
no) to the first question were used to answer research 
question 4.
At the end of Period 19 the subjects were once 
again given a summary of the two divisions' operations.
Based on this information they evaluated the fairness of the 
joint cost allocation again and this data was used to answer 
research question 3.
The Compensation Given To The Subjects
The subjects were monetarily rewarded for their 
participation. Each subject was informed at the beginning 
of the experiment that he or she would receive $4 at the end
of the experiment, and in addition, he or she could receive
$50 as a bonus if his or her performance in the experiment 
turned out to be the best among all 30 performances in the
30-subject group to which he or she belonged.
Each subject's performance was measured as follows:
19
PM = . L NI.
1=0 1
where PM = performance measure
N K =  net income earned by a subject
in period 1
This measurement of each subject's performance is 
based on the assumption that each subject (manager) is 
evaluated based on the amount of profit he or she earns. In
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fact, the design of the performance evaluation system is 
very important to a firm in achieving its overall goal. How 
we chose to measure performance may very well affect 
subject's pricing decisions. In this study subject's 
performance was measured using net income in the belief that 
such a measure is the most common1y used way of evaluating 
performance in practice.
The Subjects
The ideal subjects for this study would have been 
actual managers from a business similar to the copy shop.
But the limited resources available for this study precluded 
obtaining such subjects. In this situation researchers 
commonly use college students enrolled in business courses 
as surrogates for managers. Initially an effort was made to 
use students enrolled in the senior level Business Policy 
course, but an insufficient number of these students 
volunteered to participate. The next choice was to ask 
students enrolled in the managerial accounting course to 
participate. These students are mostly sophomores and 
juniors.
The subjects participating in the experiment were 
students enrolled in the Managerial Accounting course at the 
University of Oklahoma during the Spring term, 1983. A 
total of 120 students participated. The subjects consisted 
of 4 freshmen, 65 sophomores, 41 juniors, 8 seniors, 1
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graduate, and 1 unclassified student. These were 39 
Accounting majors, 27 Finance majors, 39 Management majors,
5 Marketing majors, and 10 non-business majors. Of the 120 
subjects, 81 had work experience. They were all volunteers 
who agreed to participate in the experiment. The request 
for students' participation in the experiment is shown in 
Appendix E.
Data Obtained From The Experiment 
From the experiment, the following data were
obtained:
(1) the selling price set for each period by each manager
(2) the net income earned by each divisional manager for 
each period
(3) the subjects' indication of the level of fairness of 
the joint cost allocation (obtained at the end of 
Periods 13 and 19)
(4) the "yes or no" responses to the question concerning 
whether to continue using the joint copier (obtained 
at the end of Period 19)
The above data were obtained for each of the 
following 30-subject groups:
(1) the Division 1 managers under the N method
(2) the Division 2 managers under the N method
(3) the Division 1 managers under the S method
(4) the Division 2 managers under the S method
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The data obtained from the experiment are 
illustrated in figure 6. The raw data was used to generate 
the variables used in the analysis as described in the next 
section.
The Statistical Designs 
The statistical analysis of sample data obtained 
from an experiment attempts to generalize to a larger 
population. Research questions are answered by testing 
hypotheses. In order to test the hypotheses appropriate 
statistical models and variables for the models should be 
selected. In the following section the statistical designs 
used for testing the hypotheses, the appropriate models and 
the variables selected in this study will be described.
Design For Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 
As stated earlier, research question 1 asks about 
the effect that the two cost allocation methods have on 
divisional managers' pricing decisions. In order to answer 
question 1 three null hypotheses were set; the first 
hypothesis (H(1)) concerns the net incomes earned by the 
Division 1 managers, the second hypothesis (H(2)) examines 
the net incomes earned by the Division 2 managers, and the 
third hypothesis (H(3)) investigates the effect on the 
firm's overall net income. These hypotheses can be tested 
by applying the analysis of variance model. The analysis of 
variance model is a statistical technique used to determine
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if samples came from populations with equal means. This 
model may be appropriate whenever the observations are 
subdivided into identifiable groups. The experiment in this 
study provides observations on the criterion variables under 
two identifiable groups, i.e., the N method group and the S 
method group. Therefore, this model is appropriate for 
testing the first three hypotheses.
In order to test the above three hypotheses a
multivariate analysis of covariance (MANOCOVA hereafter) 
model was used. The NIANOCOVA model adds a covariance 
analysis to the multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA 
hereafter) model. MANOVA is particularly useful for 
examining interrelated criterion variables, because it 
allows simultaneous testing for the treatment effect on two
or more criterion variables and this "simultaneous"
consideration allows control of «-level. Afifi and Azen 
(1979, p. 86) mentioned the overall significance level of 
more than one test of hypotheses as follows:
If the investigator wishes to make more than one 
test of these hypotheses, then the overall significance 
level (that is, the significance level of all of his 
tests combined) may be nowhere near the nominal «.
Thus, he is unable to assert that all of his tests were 
simultaneously made at the « level.
To circumvent this problem, the investigator may use a
MANOVA procedure for all of his tests so that he is able to
assert that all of the tests are at the ot level, that is,
the overall level is the nominal a.
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During Periods 9-13 of the experiment, divisional
managers used a joint copier. Under one set of the
experiments divisional net income was determined by
allocating the joint cost using the net realizable value
method whereas the Shapley value allocation was used for the
other set of experiments. In this situation the different
cost allocation methods are non-metric predictor variables
(independent variables) and the divisional managers'
performances in terms of divisional and overall net income
are metric criterion variables (dependent variables). To
measure how well the divisional managers set selling prices,
the absolute difference between the optimal net income and
the actual net income as a percentage of the optimal net
income was calculated. Algebraically, the measurement is
presented as follows:
|NI*(i) - NI(i)|/NI*(i)
where NI*(i)= the optimal net income for Division i
(i= 1, 2)
NI(i) = the actual net income earned by 
Division i managers
Similarly, the absolute difference between the 
optimal overall net income and the overall net income 
actually earned as a percentage of the optimal overall net 
income was calculated. The measurement is algebraically 
shown below.
I ONI* - ONI I/ONI*
where ONI*= the optimal overall net income
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ONI = the overall net income actually earned by 
the two managers
The first two hypotheses are concerned with the 
effect of the two different allocation methods on the 
individual divisional managers' pricing performance while 
the third hypothesis examines the effect of the methods on 
the firm's overall profit position. Since these three 
criteria are interrelated, MANOVA is appropriate to test 
these three hypotheses simultaneously.
In investigating whether there is any significantly 
different effect on the criterion variables between the two 
different allocation schemes, it is necessary to control for 
any differences in the subjects' innate ability across 
treatments. To remove these extraneous influences a 
covariance analysis can be used. Hair, Anderson, Tatham, 
and Grablowsky (1979, p. 146) address the merits of 
covariate analysis:
Use of multivariate analysis of covariance 
(MANOCOVA) with MANOVA improves the precision of an 
experiment by removing possible sources of variance in 
the criterion variable that may be accounted for by 
metric independent variables not controlled in the 
experimental design. Removing these extraneous 
influences reduces the residual error, thereby 
increasing the "pure" effect of the treatment variables.
During Periods 1-8 of the experiment each 
divisional manager used his or her own copier. There was no 
allocation of joint cost and therefore their decisions were 
unaffected by the two different allocation methods. A 
measure of each subject's performance during these trials
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was used as a measure of innate ability. On the assumption 
that subjects' performance improved as periods went on, the 
8th period's performances were selected as the covariates 
for testing the first three hypotheses in this study.
Using subjects' performances during Periods 9-13 of 
the experiment as dependent variables, a MANGCOVA was 
performed for each period. The MANGCOVA model can be 
presented as follows:
where subscript i = observations (i=1,...,30)
subscript j = allocation methods
(j=1: the N method 
j=2; the S method)
subscript k = Periods (k= 9, 10, 11, 12, 13)
= the percentage of the absolute difference 
between the optimal net income and the actual 
net income earned by the Division 1 manager 
relative to the optimal net income for 
observation i in the jth subclass in Period k
(2)
jY . = the percentage of the absolute difference
between the optimal net income and the actual 
net income earned by the Division 2 manager 
relative to the optimal net income for 
observation i in the jth subclass in Period k
jY .. = the percentage of the absolute difference
between the optimal overall net income and the 
overall net income actually earned by the firm 
relative to the optimal overall net income for 
observation i in the jth subclass in Period k
= a fixed parameter representing the population 
mean of the first criterion variable
(2)
y = a fixed parameter representing the population 
mean of the second criterion variable
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/q\
VI = a fixed parameter representing the population 
mean of the third criterion variable
a!' = the fixed mean deviation from , of the
observations in subclass j
= the fixed mean deviation from of the
observations in subclass j
= the fixed mean deviation from of the
observations in subclass j
xY. = the percentage of the absolute difference
between the optimal net income and the actual 
net income earned by the Division 1 manager 
relative to the optimal net income for 
observation i in the jth subclass in Period 8
(2 )
X^ . = the percentage of the absolute difference
between the optimal net income and the actual 
net income earned by the Division 2 manager 
relative to the optimal net income for 
observation i in the jth subclass in Period 8
(q \
X.. = the percentage of the absolute difference
between the optimal overall net income and the 
overall net income actually earned by the firm 
relative to the optimal overall net income for 
observation i in the jth subclass in period 8
3'^  ^ = coefficient of covariate X^ ^
o<2)
ij
= coefficient of covariate 
= coefficient of covariate
ij
e[\ = the random deviation of observation i in
subclass j from the subclass mean of the first 
criterion variable
= the random deviation of observation i in
subclass j from the subclass mean of the second 
criterion variable
= the random deviation of observation i in
subclass j from the subclass mean of the third 
criterion variable
There are two types of effects that can be studied 
in analysis of variance designs. In the fixed effects
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design, no attempt is made to infer beyond the specific 
levels of the factors actually incorporated in the 
experiment. In the random effects design, however, the 
factor levels are chosen randomly from the population of 
levels of interest to a researcher. Inferences in the 
latter case can then be made to the entire population of 
levels. In the above MANOCOVA design the non-metric 
independent variables are "fixed." Since the factor levels 
(i.e., the two different allocation schemes) constitutes the 
entire population of research interest, the design is a 
fixed-effects model and no effort is made to infer beyond 
the groups being analyzed.
In order to determine the significance of the 
overall main effects in the above MANOCOVA design, Wilks's 
lambda statistic was used. The test statistic is presented 
below (Harris, 1975, p. 109).
A = |E|/|H+E| = 1/|E'\l+I|
where E = the within-group covariance matrix 
H = the between-group covariance matrix 
I = the identity matrix 
Most texts and most computer programs employ the 
Wilks's lambda criteria for significance tests in MANOVA.
The reasons for this preference are stated by Harris (1975, 
p. 109) as follows;
(a) historical precedence.
(b) while the exact distribution of U ( a ) is 
extremely complex, fairly good approximations to this
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distribution in terms of readily available chi-square 
and F-table entries exist.
(c) under certain circumstances, especially for data 
where the successive characteristic roots of E n  are 
nearly equal, statistical tests based on U ( a  ) are more 
powerful than greatest characteristic root (gcr) tests.
(d) determinants are easier to compute than are 
characteristic roots.
Several conditions must be met for the proper 
application of the MANOVA. According to Hair et al. (1979, 
pp. 145-159) the assumptions underlying MANOVA can be 
summarized as follows:
(1) Random sampling
(2) The observations within cells should be independent.
(3) The set of dependent variables should be 
jointly normally distributed.
(4) The error variance should be equal among the 
cells (the treatment groups).
Since this study employed volunteer subjects from 
an available pool, it does not constitute random sampling, 
but the lack of random sampling will not seriously distort 
any conclusions. It is questionable whether or not the 
distributional assumptions for MANOCOVA are met in the 
observations made in this study. In commenting on the 
effects of violations of distributional assumptions in 
multivariate analysis, Harris (1975, pp. 231-233) is quite 
optimistic about the robustness of multivariate tests, so 
long as the treatment groups have the same sample size and 
the sample size is sufficiently large. Harris (1975, p.
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233) further states:
The issue of robustness of multivariate tests is the 
focus of a great deal of current effort by mathematical 
statisticians, and large strides can be expected within 
the next few years. Most indications are that 
multivariate techniques will prove as robust as their 
univariate counterparts.
In addition to the MANOVA assumptions, there are
additional conditions to be met to make MANOCOVA effective.
That is, MANOCOVA is appropriate only when the relationship
between the covariates and the criterion variables is
linear, and wnen there is no interaction between covariates
and non-metric independent variables (Hair et al., 1979, p.
146). The second condition seems to be satisfied in this
study. But, it is not clear whether or not the first
condition is met in this study. Therefore, the MANOCOVA
model applied in this study will be effective only to the
extent that the relationship between the covariates and the
criterion variables is close to linear. However, linear
models are frequently found to be excellent approximations
to the types of non-linear models found in experimental
studies similar to this study.
Design For Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 
As mentioned earlier, research question 2 is 
concerned with whether there is a significant difference 
between the two allocation schemes in their effect on the 
divisional managers' ability to adjust prices when the 
demand function changes. Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 were set to
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answer this question. The fourth hypothesis (H(4)) concerns 
the net incomes earned by the Division 1 managers when the 
demand function changed, the fifth hypothesis (H(5)) 
examines the net incomes earned by the Division 2 managers, 
and the sixth hypothesis (H(6 )) investigates the effect on 
the firm's overall net income when the demand function 
changed.
In order to test the above three hypotheses a 
MANOCOVA model was applied. Since the test of these three 
hypotheses is similar to the test of the first three 
hypotheses, the discussion in the previous section on the 
MANOCOVA model also applies here. The model can be 
presented in exactly the same form as shown on page 63. The 
MANOCOVA was performed for each period using the subjects' 
performances during Periods 14-19 as the dependent 
vari ables.
Design For Hypotheses 7 and 8
Research question 3 addresses the difference 
between the two allocation schemes in terms of their 
perceived fairness in the division of joint cost. Two 
hypothesis tests were used to answer this question. The 
seventh hypothesis (H(7)) investigates any significant 
difference in the divisional managers' combined perceived 
level of fairness concerning the allocation of the joint 
cost under the two allocation schemes. The eighth
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hypothesis (H(8)) searches for differences in the 
perceptions of the fairness of the joint cost allocation 
between the two divisional managers under the two allocation 
schemes.
In the experiment, the divisional managers 
evaluated the fairness of the joint cost allocation by 
indicating their perceived level of fairness on a four-point 
scale. The criterion variable for the seventh hypothesis is 
the divisional managers' perceived level of fairness 
concerning the allocation of the joint cost. For this 
variable the two managers' fairness scores in each pair were 
summed. The summed scores indicate how the two divisional 
managers together felt about the joint cost allocation. 
However, this measure is not sufficient to capture whether 
the divisional managers will cooperate in using a facility 
jointly, when doing so is beneficial to the firm. If the two 
managers disagree about the fairness of an allocation, they 
might not cooperate. In the preveious measure of fairness, 
there could be a situation in which a pair of divisional 
managers show the same summed fairness score as that shown 
by another pair of managers, but the managers in one pair 
might have similar scores whereas the managers in another 
pair may feel very differently about the fairness. For 
example, the first Division 1 manager might circle fairness 
point 2 (i.e., the manager feels the allocation is a little 
unfair) and the first Division 2 manager might select point
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3 (i.e., the manager feels the allocation is moderately 
fair). On the other hand, the second Division 1 manager 
might pick point 1 (i.e., the manager feels the allocation 
is very unfair) and the second Division 2 manager might 
select point 4 (i.e., the manager feels the allocation is 
very fair). This example shows that even though the two 
pairs of divisional managers indicate the same summed score 
of 5, managers in the first pair are mere in agreement than 
the second pair. Because the managers in the second pair 
feel so differently about the fairness of the allocation, 
they might discontinue the joint use of the copier. The 
eighth hypothesis was formulated to capture this situation. 
For the eighth hypothesis the criterion variable is the 
level of disparity between the fairness perceptions between 
the two managers. For this variable the absolute difference 
between the two subjects' fairness scores was calculated for 
each pair.
In the experiment the divisional managers evaluated 
the fairness of the joint cost allocation at two times; 
first at the end of Period 13, and second at the end of 
Period 19. When the managers evaluated the fairness at the 
end of Period 13 they were informed of how the allocation of 
the joint cost was made. Prior to the end of Period 13 the 
managers did not know how the joint cost was allocated. The 
managers evaluated the fairness again at the end of Period 
19 because it was felt that there might be some change in
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the managers' perceptions of the fairness of the allocation 
after they could change their strategy when knowing how the 
allocation was calculated.
Hypotheses H(7) and H(8) were tested by again using 
a MANOVA model and a MANGCOVA model. MANOVA was applied 
using the observations of the managers' evaluation of the 
fairness at the end of Period 13. The MANOVA model is 
presented below.
where subscript i = observations (i=1,...,30)
subscript j = allocation methods
(j=1 ; the N method 
j=2; the S method)
y = the sum of the two managers' fairness scores 
for observation i in the jth subclass in 
Period 13
(2)
li^ ii " the absolute difference between the two
managers' fairness scores for observation i 
in the jth subclass in Period 13
= a fixed parameter representing the population 
mean of the first criterion variable
tn\
u -a fixed parameter representing the population 
mean of the second criterion variable
ctH’ = the fixed mean deviation from of the
J observations in subclass j
= the fixed mean deviation from of the
J observations in subclass j
= the random deviation of observation i in 
 ^ subclass j from the subclass mean of the first 
criterion variable
(2)£ ^ . = the random deviation of observation i in
subclass j from the subclass mean of the second 
criterion variable
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MANOCOVA was applied using the observations of the 
managers' evaluation of the fairness at the end of Period
19. The MANOCOVA model is shown below.
where subscript i = observations (i=1,...,30)
subscript j = allocation methods
(j=1; the N method 
j=2; the S method)
.qFV! = the sum of the two managers' fairness scores 
for observation i in the jth subclass in 
Period 19
(2)
F.. = the absolute difference between the two19' ij
managers' fairness scores for observation i 
in the jth subclass in Period 19
= a fixed parameter representing the population 
mean of the first criterion variable
= a fixed parameter representing the population 
mean of the second criterion variable
= the fixed mean deviation from of the
 ^ observations in subclass j
«9^  = the fixed mean deviation from of the
 ^ observations in subclass j
i/ij ■ the sum of the two managers' fairness scores 
for observation i in the jth subclass in 
Period 13
(2)
i^i- = the absolute difference between the two
managers' fairness scores for observation i 
in the jth subclass in Period 13
= coefficient of covariate 
3^^^ = coefficient of covariate
ej = the random deviation of observation i in 
subclass j from thi 
criterion variable
e subclass mean of the first
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(2)
e .. = the random deviation of observation i in
subclass j from the subclass mean of the second 
criterion variable
Design For Hypothesis 9
Research question 4 concerns whether the managers 
are more willing to cooperate in the use of a joint facility 
under one allocation scheme versus the other. To answer 
this question the ninth hypothesis (H(9)) was set. The 
criterion variable for this hypothesis is the managers' "yes 
or no" response to the question of whether they wished to 
continue using a copier jointly. At the end of Period 19 of 
the experiment, the managers answered yes or no to this 
question. Two proportions were calculated; one is the 
proportion of "yes" answers out of each group of 60 
subjects, and the other is the proportion of simultaneous 
"yes" answers by both subjects in a pair. The first 
proportion was considered because it indicates the degree to 
which divisional managers are encouraged to continue using 
the joint copier. The second proportion was considered 
because it shows the extent to which both managers agree to 
continued cooperation.
Student t-test's were used to test hypothesis H(9). 
At first a t-test was performed using the first proportion 
(denoted as PY) as the criterion variable and then another 
t-test was performed using the second proportion (denoted as 
PYY) as the criterion variable.
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The null hypothesis for the first t-test is 
presented below.
H(9)i : PY^ = PYg
where PY = proportion of "yes" answers under
the N method
PYg = proportion of "yes" answers under 
the S method
The null hypothesis for the second t-test is
presented below.
H(9>2 : PYY^ = PYYg
where PYY^ = proportion of simultaneous "yes"
answers by both managers under 
the N method
PYYg = proportion of simultaneous "yes" 
answers by both managers unde*' 
the S method
The appropriate test statistic in this case is the 
t statistic as shown below.
t = (P^-Pj-lPi-Pg ) / "p 
where P^= true proportion of group 1
P^= true proportion of group 2
P^= estimate of Pj^
P„= estimate of P^
a = estimate of the standard deviation of
the sample pooled proportions
P(1-P)((1/N, ) + (1/N J)
where = sample size of group 1 
Ng = sample size of group 2 
'P = estimate of pooled proportion
= ( N 1 Î S 1 + N 2 P 2  ) / ( N i + N 2 )
The null hypothesis to be tested implies that the
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variances of the two populations are equal. This is a 
necessary assumption for the t test in this situation.
The statistical models and variables for the 
research questions and the hypotheses are summarized in 
table 9.
TABLE 9
THE STATISTICAL MODELS AND VARIABLES
Statistical
models
Variables
Q* H** Dependent Independent Covariate
H(1) J:
kYif
f]
1 H(2) MANGCOVA Method
H(3) kYif
2
H(4)
H(5)
H(6)
MANOCOVA J:
Y 13)
. . k l i i___
Method
1
3
H(7) MANOVA rU) pl2)
U . i i  l U - i i -
pU) pl2)
13-ü IlC  ii_
Method
H(8) MANOCOVA Method cU) 
i f  i j ’ l f  i j
4 H(9) t- test PY Method -
PYY Method -
* Q stands for research questions. 
** H stands for hypotheses.
Summary
This chapter presented the specific research
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questions addressed in this study. Hypotheses were then 
stated for each question. Next, the experiments used for 
gathering data relevant for the testing of the hypotheses 
was described. Finally, the chapter described the 
statistical design to be used for analyzing the data. The 
results from these statistical tests will follow in the next 
chapter.
CHAPTER IV 
THE RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL TESTS
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the 
statistical tests for each statistical design described in 
Chapter III. Before presenting the results, the performance 
measures calculated from the raw data for the statistical 
designs are briefly discussed.
Statistical Results Bv Design 
Design for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 
The first hypothesis was included to determine 
whether there is any difference between the N method and the 
S method in leading the Division 1 managers to set prices 
that render net incomes closer to the optimal net income.
The performance measure used to evaluate managers' pricing 
performance was the absolute difference between the optimal 
net income for Division 1 and the actual net incomes earned 
by the Division 1 managers as a percentage of the optimal 
net income for Period 8 and Periods 9-13.
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The second hypothesis concerned whether there was 
any difference between the N method and the S method in 
leading the Division 2 managers to set prices that render 
net incomes closer to the optimal net income. Again the 
performance measure was the absolute difference between the 
optimal net income for Division 2 and the actual net incomes 
earned by the Division 2 managers as a percentage of the 
optimal net income for Period 8 and Periods 9-13.
The third hypothesis investigated whether there was 
any difference between the firm's overall net income under 
the N method and the S method. For this hypothesis the 
absolute difference between the optimal overall net income 
and the total net income actually earned by both managers as 
a percentage of the optimal overall net income for Period 8 
and Periods 9-13 was calculated. Mean values for the 
managers' performance under each method in percentage terms 
appear in table 10.
The MANOCOVA model described in Chapter III was 
applied for each period (Periods 9-13) using the Statistical 
Analysis System package (SAS hereafter) to test the first 
three hypotheses. The managers' performance measures for 
Period 8 were used as covariates. First, the Wilks's lambda 
( A ) statistic was investigated to determine the 
significance of the overall treatment effects in the 
MANOCOVA model. In SAS, however, the distribution of A was 
transformed into the F distribution so that the readily
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TABLE 10
MEAN VALUES FOR THE MANAGERS' PERFORMANCE 
(PERIODS 9-13 WITH PERIOD 8)
Period
Division 1 
managers' 
performance!1)
Division 2 
managers' 
performance(2 )
Overa 11 
net income 
performance!3)
N
method
S
method
N
method
S
method
N
method
S
method
8 2.82% 1.52% 7.39% 3.67% 5.18% 2.60%
9 29.72 32.80 38.40 32.68 34.78 31.83
10 16.66 25.46 25.92 19.93 21.91 21.41
11 13.93 20.76 16.54 5.58 15.44 11.13
12 6.33 14.71 9.18 7.54 7.92 8.13
13 4.49 14.45 6.30 5.48 5.55 7.09
(1) The percentage of the absolute difference between 
the optimal net income for Division 1 and the actual 
net income earned by the Division 1 managers.
(2) The percentage of the absolute difference between 
the optimal net income for Division 2 and the actual 
net income earned by the Division 2 managers.
(3) The percentage of the absolute difference between 
the optimal overall net income and the actual overall 
net income earned by the managers.
available F-table can be used. If the calculated A were 
significant at the .01 level, then the univariate analysis 
of variance was performed to determine which criterion 
variable was affected by the difference in the allocation 
schemes. Table 11 shows the Wilks's lambda statistics, the 
transformed F statistics, the P values associated with the
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transformed F statistics, and the P values associated with 
the univariate F statistics for Periods 9-13.
TABLE 11 
TEST STATISTICS (PERIODS 9-13:
Period A Fit) Pit) Pi 1 ) Pi2) Pi3)
9 .8559 2.97 .0393 .8307 .9306 .8518
10 .6881 8.01 .0002* .2929 .6188 .6652
11 .6375 10.05 .0001* .6631 .0576 .6246
12 .4086 25.57 .0001* .0015* .5236 .7736
13 .2804 45.34 .0001* .0001* .2220 .3656
Note: A = the Wilks's lambda statistic
Fit) = the transformed F statistic
Pit) = P value associated with the transformed 
F statistic
P(1) = P value associated with the F statistic 
of the first criterion variable
Pi2) = P value associated with the F statistic 
of the second criterion variable
P(3) = P value associated with the F statistic 
of the third criterion variable
* indicates significant difference at .01 level.
In table 11, test statistics for Periods 9-12 were 
provided for background information and the analysis was 
made on only the statistics for Period 13. As shown in 
table 11, for Period 13, Pit) is .0001 which indicates a
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significant difference at the .01 level. This P value 
signals that a significant difference exists between the 
multivariate normal distribution of the three criterion 
variables under the N method and that under the S method.
In order to determine which criterion variable was affected 
by the different treatments (the N method or the S method), 
it is necessary to examine each univariate F statistic and 
its associated P value. In table 11 for Period 13, only 
P(1) shows a significant difference at the .01 level (P(1)= 
.0001). This P value indicates that the Division 1 managers 
under the N method made pricing decisions quite differently 
from those under the S method. Table 10 shows the managers' 
different pricing performance. In table 10, the managers' 
mean perfomances for Periods 8-12 were provided for 
background information and the analysis was made on only the 
performances for Period 13. In table 10 for Period 13 it 
can be seen that the Division 1 managers under the N method, 
on the average, set selling prices so that their net incomes 
are only 4.49% away from the optimal net income, whereas 
those under the S method, on the average, set selling prices 
which resulted in net incomes that are 14.45% away from the 
optimal net income. Based on these statistics, the first 
hypothesis (H(1)) can be rejected and it is concluded that 
the N method leads the Division 1 managers to prices that 
render net incomes closer to the optimal net incomes. In 
other words, the net realizable value allocation scheme is
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"better" than the Shapley value allocation scheme for the 
Division 1 managers' pricing decisions.
In table 11 for Period 13, P(2) and P(3) do not 
show significant differences at the .01 level: (P(2)= .2220 
and P(3)= .3656). In table 10 for Period 13 it can be seen 
that, on the average, both the Division 2 managers under the 
N method and those under the S method did well in their 
pricing decisions, showing respectively 6.30% and 5.48% 
deviations from the optimal net income. Therefore, the 
second hypothesis (H(2)) cannot be rejected and it is 
concluded that the difference in allocation schemes did not 
affect the Division 2 managers' pricing decisions. Table 
10, Period 13 also shows that, on the average, both the 
overall net incomes under the N method and those under the S 
method were relatively good (5.55% deviation under the N 
method and 7.09% deviation under the S method from the 
optimal overall net income). Therefore, the third 
hypothesis (H(3)) cannot be rejected and a conclusion can be 
drawn that the firm's overall profit position was not 
affected by the difference in allocation schemes.
Design for Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6
The fourth, fifth, and sixth hypotheses were 
formulated to see whether any difference exists between the 
N method and the S method when divisional managers must 
adapt to a change in the demand function. In the
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experiment, the demand function changed for Periods 14-19. 
The managers' performances were measured in the same manner 
as in the previous section. Mean values for the managers' 
performance under each method, in percentage terms, appear 
in table 12.
The MANOCOVA model was applied for each period 
(Periods 14-19) using SAS to test the fourth, fifth, and 
sixth hypotheses. The managers' performance measures for 
Period 8 were again used as covariates. As with the 
previous section, the Wilks's lambda, the F transformation 
of the lambda, and the multivariate P value were first 
investigated and when these multivariate statistics showed a 
significant difference, the univariate analysis of variance 
was performed to see which criterion variable was affected 
by the difference in allocation methods. Table 13 shows the 
Wilks's lambda statistics, the transformed F statistics, the 
P values associated with the transformed F statistics, and 
the P values associated with each univariate F statistics 
for Periods 14-19.
As mentioned in the previous section, the analysis 
was made on only the statistics for Period 19. In table 13 
for Period 19, P(t) shows a significant difference at the 
.01 level between the two allocation schemes on the three 
criterion variables. Therefore, univariate P values were 
calculated to find.out which criterion variable was affected 
by the difference in allocation schemes. In table 13 for
84
TABLE 12
MEAN VALUES FOR THE MANAGERS' PERFORMANCE 
(PERIODS 14-19 WITH PERIOD 8)
Period
Division 1 
managers' 
performance!1)
Division 2 
managers' 
performance!2)
Overa 11 
net income 
performance!3)
N
method
S
method
N
method
S
method
N
method
S
method
8 2.82% 1.52% 7.39% 3.67% 5.18% 2.60%
14 51 .61 77.67 44.85 24.17 46.60 44.76
15 17.83 48.59 21.71 15.43 20.44 28.05
16 24.21 27.36 19.38 9.50 19.81 16.04
17 14.74 24.31 15.40 9.15 14.86 13.68
18 8.91 19.19 10.79 8.23 10.03 11.52
19 4.61 13.98 7.57 6.91 6.51 8.03
(1) The percentage of the absolute difference between 
the optimal net income for Division 1 and the actual 
net income earned by the Division 1 managers.
(2) The percentage of the absolute difference between 
the optimal net income for Division 2 and the actual 
net income earned by the Division 2 managers.
(3) The percentage of the absolute difference between 
the optimal overall net income and the actual overall 
net income earned by the managers.
Period 19, only P(1) shows a significant difference at the 
.01 level: (P(1)= .0047, P(2)= .1987, P(3)= .7006). Thus, 
only the Division 1 managers' pricing decisions were 
affected by the difference in allocation methods. Table 12 
shows how the two allocation schemes affected the divisional
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TABLE 13 
TEST STATISTICS (PERIODS 14-19)
Period A F(t) Pit) P(1 ) P(2) P(3)
14 .7882 4.75 .0054* .0896 .1878 .8839
15 .6479 9.60 .0001* .0036* .4987 .3535
16 .8330 3.54 .0204 .3214 .0580 .7123
17 .7433 6.10 .0013* .0171 .0404 .0632
18 .7323 6.46 .0009* .0900 .0010* .0929
19 .4535 21.29 .0001* .0047* .1987 .7006
Note: A = the Wilks's lambda statistic
F(t) = the transformed F statistic
P(t) = P value associated with the transformed 
F statistic
P(1) = P value associated with the F statistic of 
the first criterion variable
P(2) = P value associated with the F statistic of 
the second criterion variable
P(3) = P value associated with the F statistic of 
the third criterion variable
* indicates significant difference at .01 level.
managers' ability to adjust selling prices to the changed 
demand function. As stated in the previous section, the 
analysis was made on only the managers' performances for 
Period 19. Table 12 at Period 19 shows that the Division 1 
managers under the N method, on the average, adapted to the 
changed function far better than those under the S method.
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The net incomes earned by those under the N method are, on 
the average, 4.61% away from the optimal net income, whereas 
the net incomes earned by those under the S method were, on 
the average, 13.98% away from the optimal net income. 
Therefore, the fourth hypothesis (H(4)) can be rejected and 
it appears that the net realizable value allocation scheme 
is "better" than the Shapley value allocation scheme in 
helping the Division 1 managers adjust to a new demand 
function. In table 12 for Period 19, both the Division 2 
managers' net incomes and the firm's overall net incomes 
show, on the average, less than ten percent deviation from 
the respective optimal net income (in the Division 2 
managers' performance, 7.57% deviation under the N method 
and 6.91% deviation under the S method; in the overall net 
income performance, 6.51% deviation under the N method and 
8.03% deviation under the S method from the respective 
optimal net income). These statistics do not indicate a 
significant difference under the two allocation schemes. 
Therefore, the fifth and the sixth hypotheses (H(5) and 
H(6)) are not rejected and it appears that the difference in 
allocation methods did not affect the Division 2 managers' 
pricing decisions nor the firm's overall profit position 
when adjusting to a changed demand function.
Design for Hypotheses 7 and 8 
The seventh hypothesis examines whether any
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difference exists in the divisional managers' perceived 
level of fairness concerning the allocation of the joint 
cost under the two allocation schemes. For this hypothesis 
the two managers' scores on the perceived fairness question 
were summed. Therefore, the perceived level for a pair of 
subjects ranges from 2 to 8. The larger the fairness 
measures, the more fair the allocation is perceived to be, 
and the more likely the managers may be to continue the 
joint use of a copier.
The eighth hypothesis was formulated to see how 
differently the managers in a pair perceive the fairness of 
the joint cost allocation under the two allocation schemes. 
In order to measure the level of disparity in fairness 
perception between the two managers, the absolute difference 
was calculated between the two fairness scores provided by 
the two managers both at the end of Period 13 and Period 19. 
Therefore,-the level of disparity in the fairness perception 
measure ranges from 0 to 3. The larger the absolute 
difference, the greater the disparity in perceived fairness 
between the two managers and the more likely they may be to 
discontinue the joint use of the copier. Mean values for 
the fairness measures under each method are shown in table 
14.
The MANOVA model described in Chapter III was 
applied for Period 13 using SAS to test the two hypotheses. 
The Wilks's lambda statistic is .9727, the transformed F
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TABLE 14
MEAN VALUES FOR THE FAIRNESS MEASURES
Per iod
Fairness
measur
overa 11
'e( 1 )
Fairness c 
measure
ii f ference
î(2)
N method S method N method S method
13
19
5.4667
5.6667
5.7000
5.6000
1.3333
1.0667
1.1000 
.7333
(1) The sum of the two managers' fairness scores.
(2) The absolute difference between the two managers'
fairness scores.
statistic is .80, and the P value is .4548. This P value 
shows no significant difference between the two allocation 
schemes in terms of the perceived fairness in the allocation 
of the joint cost. Therefore, both the seventh and the 
eighth hypotheses (H(7) and H(8)) cannot be rejected. Thus 
it is concluded that the subjects in the experiment did not 
differ in terms of their perceived fairness of the two 
allocation schemes. Table 14 shows a minor difference 
between the fairness scores made by the managers under the 
two allocation schemes. As shown in table 14 for Period 13, 
the managers under both the N method and the S method felt 
that, on the average, the joint cost allocation was neither 
fair nor unfair (the sum of the two managers' fairness 
scores is 5.4667 under the N method and 5.7000 under the S 
method). Similarly, the level of disparity in the perceived
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fairness between the two managers is not high under either 
allocation method (the absolute difference between the two 
managers' fairness scores is 1.3333 under the N method and 
1.1000 under the S method).
The MANGCOVA model was also used to see whether 
knowledge of how the allocations were calculated made any 
difference in the subjects' perception of fairness. The 
Wilks's lambda statistic is .9397, the transformed F 
statistic is 1.76, and the P value is .1809. This P value 
is too high to reject the seventh and eighth hypotheses. 
Therefore, again the conclusion is drawn that the subjects 
did not differ in their perceptions of fairness of the two 
allocation methods. In table 14 for Period 19, the sums of 
the two managers' fairness scores are similar to those at 
Period 13 (5.6667 under the N method and 5.6000 under the S 
method), but the absolute difference between the two 
managers' fairness scores declined (1.0667 under the N 
method and .7333 under the S method). Based on these 
results it is inferred that knowledge of how the allocations 
were calculated led the two managers to narrow their level 
of disparity of perceived fairness, even though they still 
felt the allocation was neither fair nor unfair.
Design for Hypothesis 9
The ninth hypothesis examined whether there is any 
difference between the two allocation schemes in encouraging
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the divisional managers to cooperate in using the joint 
copier. To measure the extent to which the managers are 
encouraged to use the joint copier, two proportions were 
calculated. The first is the proportion of "yes" answers to 
the question concerning whether they wish to continue using 
the joint copier. The second is the proportion of 
simultaneous "yes" answers by the two managers. Table 15 
shows the percentage of "yes" responses under each method.
In order to test the ninth hypothesis, two t-tests 
were used. First, a t-test was used to examine whether 
there is any difference between the two allocation schemes 
in the proportion of the number of "yes" answers. The t- 
test shows no significant difference between the two 
allocation schemes (t= -.9998, df=118, P> .10). The second 
t-test was used to test whether there is any difference 
between the two allocation methods in the proportion of the 
number of simultaneous "yes" answers. The second t-test 
also shows no significant difference between the two 
allocation schemes (t= -1.2920, df=58, P> .10). With these 
results, the ninth hypothesis (H{9)) cannot be rejected and 
it is concluded that the two allocation schemes did not lead 
the subjects to differ in the degree of cooperation in using 
the joint copier.
Summary
This chapter presented the results of the
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TABLE 15
THE PERCENTAGE OF "YES" RESPONSES
Resporise of
Disision 1 Division 2 N method S method
manager manager
Y ■ Y 12 pairs 17 pairs
Y N 1 5
N Y 15 6
N N 2 2
Number of Y 40 45
Total number of subjects 60 60
PY( 1 ) .6667 .7500
Number of YY 12 17
Total number of pairs 
of subjects 30 30
PYY(2) .4000 .5667
(1) The proportion of the number of "yes" answers to the
total number of answers.
(2) The proportion of the number of simultaneous "yes"
answers by the Division 1 manager and the Division 
2 manager to the total number of paired answers.
statistical tests for each statistical design described in 
Chapter III. The results show that the difference in 
allocation schemes made a statistically significant 
difference only in the Division 1 managers' pricing 
decisions. The results show no significant difference
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between the two allocation schemes in leading the Division 2 
managers to set prices that render net incomes closer to the 
optimal net income nor in the overall net income for the 
firm. The results also show no statistically significant 
difference in the perceived fairness of the allocations nor 
in the degree of cooperation among the managers using the 
joint copier. Among the nine hypotheses tested in this 
study only the first and the fourth hypotheses were 
rejected. In the next chapter the implications of these 
results will be explored.
CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Introduct ion
This chapter discusses the implications of this 
research, in light of its findings. The chapter also 
includes a discussion of the limitations of the experimental 
approach taken. Finally, suggestions are provided for 
further empirical research on the effects of joint cost 
allocation on decision making.
Implications Of This Study
This experimental study is the first to provide 
empirical evidence on the relative usefulness of two joint 
cost allocation methods. The net realizable and the Shapley 
value allocation schemes were compared in the context of a 
decision-making situation. The basic intent of the study 
was to determine if one of the methods was better than the 
other in the sense of whether one method led to better 
decisions and more cooperation.
This study addressed four research questions. The
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first question concerned the difference, if any, between the 
effects of the two allocation schemes on managers' pricing 
decisions. The first three hypotheses were directed at this 
research question. The statistical tests only show a 
significant difference between the two allocation methods in 
affecting the Division 1 managers' pricing decisions. They 
do not indicate significant differences in the Division 2 
managers' pricing decisions nor in the firm's overall profit 
position. Since the firm's overall profit position is not 
affected by the difference in allocation methods, the firm's 
central manager may wish to select between the two based on 
other factors (e.g., which is the cheaper method and/or 
which is easier to adopt).
For this research question, the statistical tests 
provide anomolous results: that is, the difference in 
allocation schemes made a significant difference in the 
Division 1 managers' pricing decisions, but it did not make 
a significant difference in the Division 2 managers' pricing 
decisions. It is unclear why these different results occur. 
Possibly, the subjects in the two groups differed in some 
unknown way. However, assuming that these results are 
valid, table 10 shows that the S method led the Division 1 
managers to poor pricing decisions. Hence, the N method 
appears preferable.
The second research question asked whether managers 
could better adapt to a change in demand with one method
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versus the other. The fourth, fifth, and sixth hypotheses 
were formulated to examine this research question. The 
statistical tests provide results similar to those for 
research question 1. Again, no significant difference 
exists between the two methods in their effect on the firm's 
overall net income. Therefore, again the firm's central 
manager may be advised to adopt either of these two schemes 
based on other factors. Again, different results are shown 
in the effect of allocation methods on the divisional 
managers' pricing decisions; that is, the allocation schemes 
led to a significant difference in the Division 1 managers' 
pricing decisions, but it did not make a significant 
difference in the Division 2 managers' pricing decisions.
As shown in table 12, the Division 1 managers under the S 
method again made poor pricing decisions when they 
encountered a changed demand function. Therefore, based on 
the same consideration as in research question 1, the N 
method seems preferable.
A potential explanation for the fact that the 
allocations affected the Division 1 managers but not the 
Division 2 managers was examined. At the beginning of 
Period 14 in the experiment, the instructions given to the 
participants (see page 124) may have been interpreted to 
mean that prices should go up. It is true that the optimal 
action for the Division 2 managers was to raise the price, 
but for Division 1 the optimal action was to lower the
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price. To see if this had an effect, the direction of each 
participant's price change for Period 14 was examined. The 
experimental results show that about half of the Division 1 
managers set a higher price in Period 14, but there is no 
significant difference between the N method group and the S 
method group (15 subjects under the N method and 17 under 
the S method set a higher price in Period 14). In addition, 
the direction of the price changes was not much different 
between the Division 1 managers and the Division 2 managers 
(9 Division 2 managers under the N method and 15 under the S 
method raised the price).
The third research question addressed the issue of 
the perceived fairness of the two allocation schemes. The 
seventh and eighth hypotheses were used to examine this 
research question. The results of the test show no 
significant difference between the two allocation schemes in 
terms of perceived fairness. As shown in table 14 the two 
allocation methods are about the same in the level of 
fairness perceived by the managers. These results do not 
support the argument that the Shapley value allocation 
scheme can be viewed as providing for a more equitable 
sharing of cost externalities arising from the jointness of 
production.
At the end of Period 13 and Period 19 of the 
experiment, the subjects were asked to specify the factors 
that they considered in measuring the level of fairness of
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the allocation. As shown in table 16, the majority of the 
subjects in this study thought that the joint cost should
TABLE 16
FACTORS INFLUENCING FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS
N method S method
Factors Di vis on 1 Divi S' on 2 Di vis on 1 Divis on 2
PI 3* P19* P13* P19* P13* P19* P13* P19*
15 18 17 15 18 19 15 16
14 10 9 12 7 9 13 13
1 2 4 3 5 2 2 1
(1) Number of 
copies sold
(2) Net income
(3) Cost 
savings
* PIS stands for Period 13 and P19, for Period 19.
(1) The joint cost should be allocated based on how much
a division uses the common copier.
(2) The joint cost should be allocated based on how much
net income a division earns.
(3) The joint cost should be allocated such that the cost
savings from the jointness are divided evenly 
between the two divisions.
be allocated based on how much a division uses the common 
copier. Therefore, they support the minimum resource 
allocation scheme (or the activity level allocation scheme), 
About one third of the subjects thought that the joint cost 
should be allocated based on how much net income a division 
earns. Therefore, they support the net realizable value 
allocation scheme. Only a few subjects thought that the
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joint cost should be al located such that the cost savings 
from the jointness are divided evenly between the two 
divisions. Therefore, the Shapley value allocation scheme 
did not receive much support from the subjects in this 
study. This implies that the Shapley value allocation 
scheme had less "common sense" appeal to the relatively 
naive subjects in this study.
The last research question concerned the difference 
between the two allocation schemes in encouraging the 
divisional managers to use a common facility. The ninth 
hypothesis was directed at this research question. The 
results of the tests show no significant difference between 
the two allocation methods even though the managers under 
the S method were more encouraged to use the common copier 
(in table 15, PY under the S method is .7500 which is 
greater than .6667 under the N method; PYY under the S 
method is .5667 which is larger than .4000 under the N 
method).
At the end of the experiment the subjects were 
asked to list the factors which led to their decision of 
whether they would continue to use the joint copier. About 
half of the subjects (56 subjects out of 120) answered that 
the cost savings (or negative cost savings when they 
answered "no") led them to make their decision. The other 
half of the subjects (60 subjects out of 120) answered that 
the amount of net income led them to decide whether to
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continue sharing the copier. If they earned less net income 
at the end of Period 19 (when they jointly used a common 
copier), they decided not to share the common copier.
It would be possible that subjects may not want to 
share the copier even though sharing the copier renders cost 
savings. Because even in a situation where they get savings 
in the copier rental cost, they might earn a smaller amount 
of net income than when they used a separate copier 
independently. This situation could occur depending on the 
demand and cost functions and on how the managers set their 
prices. Therefore, it is hard to differentiate the effect 
of a cost allocation scheme from poor pricing decisions on 
the managers' decision whether to continue using the joint 
copier.
Among the remaining four subjects, three did not 
want to use the joint copier because they did not like the 
unpredictable costs and net incomes in the joint use 
situation. One subject indicated "the number of copies 
sold" as the factor that affected his decision, but he seems 
to have misunderstood the question.
An interesting finding in this question is that no 
subject indicated "fairness" per se as a factor that 
affected his or her decision. Judging from the responses of 
the subjects in this study, "fairness", as such, is not 
related to the managers' decision whether to continue using 
the joint copier. Instead the decision was much more
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related to economic considerations: such as the existence of 
cost savings or higher net income.
At the end of the experiment the subjects were 
asked what factors they considered when they selected 
selling prices. Most of the subjects (94 subjects out of 
120) indicated they concentrated on net income and a few 
subjects indicated they followed sales or costs (13 subjects 
for sales and 13 subjects for costs). These responses 
indicate that most of the subjects were concerned with the 
amount of net income that they earned, which makes sense 
since they were evaluated based on how much net income they 
earn. This fact indirectly confirms that the performance 
evaluation system and the monetary reward offered to the 
subjects effectively worked to encourage them to do well in 
performing the experiment.
In the experiment, allocated costs, per se, were 
not considered by the subjects when setting prices. But, 
for those that concentrated on net income, there was an 
indirect effect since the allocated cost was subtracted from 
sales revenue to yield net income. Hence it was still 
possible for the allocation to have a differing effect on 
the subject's pricing decisions.
While examining the raw data obtained from the 
experiment, three outliers (i.e., three subjects who set 
prices and answered the questions in an unusual or 
apparently careless way) were found. To determine whether
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these three outliers had a significant effect on the results 
of this study, the statistical tests were repeated for the 
data set without these outliers. The results, however, 
indicated no difference from the results with the outliers. 
Therefore, the results without the outliers are not reported 
in this study.
Limitations Of This Study
This study used a laboratory experiment with 
student subjects. In this type of study serious questions 
may be raised concerning the validity of the results of this 
experiment in the real world. It may be asked (1) if the 
laboratory can approximate complex reality and (2) if 
student subjects can represent actual decision makers in the 
real world.
The first question is about the research setting 
and the research task. The research setting and task in 
this study were hypothetical. Cost and demand functions in 
this study were arbitrarily constructed. Therefore, the 
findings and conclusions of this study will be valid only to 
the extent that the functions are realistic, some 
limitations are inherent in the assumptions in the 
hypothetical setting. For example, the participants were 
told to maximize short-run profit; the decentralized 
divisions use a copier jointly; and yet the market is 
clearly segmented for the divisions which use the same
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copier. These assumptions decrease the experimental 
reali ty.
The underlying reasons for the concern raised in 
the second question are those given by Birnberg and Nath 
(1968, p. 40) who state:
The analogous real world group is likely to differ 
from the student subjects in two ways:
1. A lack of common skills and experience 
between the two groups.
2. A lack of comparable basic personality 
traits in both the subjects and the relevant 
non-experimental reference groups.
Several accounting studies which have focused on 
decision making have found considerable similarities in the 
decisions and the underlying information-processing behavior 
of student and non-student groups. For example, Dyckman 
(1966) found that students and businessmen made very similar 
evaluations of two experimental firms and that their 
decisions appeared to be based on similar factors. Mock 
(1969), Hofstedt (1972), and Dickhaut (1973) all found 
essentially no differences between students and businessmen 
in their experimental tasks. These findings provide some 
support for the use of students in this study. But, as 
Birnberg and Nath stated, the subjects in this study do lack 
skills and experience in business. They may also have 
different personality traits. For example, they may react 
differently in stressful situations. Students may strive to 
optimize rather than satisfice despite additional stress.
In contrast, real managers may avoid stress by trying to
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satisfice. These differences may result in findings which 
would not be representative of outcome in an actual business 
situation.
Other limitations are technical in nature. That 
is, there were budget and time constraints in conducting the 
experiments. If each experiment were conducted over a span 
of several weeks, subjects would have had more time to 
contemplate the fairness, or lack thereof, of the allocation 
methods. Consequently, different results might be obtained 
in such a situation. Some of these limitations could be 
overcome through further research.
Suggestions For Further Research
Because of the unusual results obtained for 
research questions one and two, a replication of this study 
would be useful to determine if the results herein are 
confirmed with a different group of subjects and with 
different setting and/or situations. In this study the 
reward system was based on divisional income, i.e., each 
subject was evaluated and rewarded based on how much his or 
her division earned. But, if the reward system were based 
on firm-wide income, that is, if it were based on how much 
the Division 1 and the Division 2 managers earn together, 
the results of the study might have differed. A replication 
of this study using a field experiment might also provide 
more generalizable results on the effects of the allocation
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scheme on managers' pricing decisions. If managers in a 
real business could be used as subjects in the experiment, 
the external validity of the results would increase. If 
both students and managers could be used as subjects, the 
results of the student subjects and those of the manager 
subjects could be compared and some conclusions could be 
drawn on the student surrogate problem in this context.
This study selected the net realizable value 
allocation and the Shapley value allocation scheme because 
they seemed to be the most widely used or discussed schemes. 
There are other allocation schemes that could be compared.
As introduced in Chapter I, there are also the minimum 
resource allocation scheme (or the activity level allocation 
scheme), the bargaining theory allocation scheme, and the 
Wloriarity allocation scheme. Especially because the minimum 
resource allocation was perceived as being the most "common 
sense" method (as shown by the responses of the subjects in 
this study) it should be a candidate for further study.
As mentioned in Chapter I, Roth and Verrecchia 
(1979) suggest that the Shapley value allocation may be 
viewed as a costless surrogate for the bargaining process, 
while Boatsman, Hansen, and Kimbrel1 (1981) maintain that 
the minimum resource allocation scheme is a suitable 
surrogate for the bargaining process. These conflicting 
normative arguments might be resolved by empirically 
comparing these two allocations and a pure bargaining
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allocation. From a different perspective it has been 
suggested that allocations are not necessary. Hence it 
would also be useful to compare the various allocation 
schemes with no allocation in a decision situation.
The replications and extentions mentioned above 
should help to provide further empirical evidence on the 
effect of various allocation procedures on managers' 
decision behavior. The present study has provided a 
starting point by providing empirical evidence on the 
relative usefulness of two allocation procedures. It is 
hoped that this study will interest other researchers to 
join the quest for further information on the effects of 
allocations.
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APPENDIX A
CALCULATION OF THE OPTIMAL PRICES AND NET INCOMES
Given the demand functions (on page 33) and the 
cost functions (on pages 35-36), it is possible to calculate 
the optimal price and net income using the traditional 
microeconomic profit maximization model by equating marginal 
revenue and marginal cost. In the computation of the 
optimal price and net income the following notation is 
useful :
X. = quantity sold in number of copies by Division i
(i=1,2)
X* = optimal quantity that renders the maximum net 
 ^ i ncome
X = combined quantity sold by Division 1 and 
Division 2
P. = selling price in dollars set by the manager 
 ^ of Division i
P* = optimal price that renders the maximum net 
 ^ income of Division i
TR^ = total revenue of Division i
TC^ = total cost of Division i
TC = combined total cost of Division 1 and Division 2 
MR^ = marginal revenue of Division i 
MC^ = marginal cost of Division i
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MC = marginal cost of Division 1 and Division 2 
combined
CM* = optimal contribution margin of Division i
X
CM* = optimal contribution margin of Division 1 and 
Division 2 combined
FC = combined fixed cost of Division 1 and Division 2
NI* = optimal net income of Division i
NI* = optimal overall net income
IFC^ = independent fixed cost of Division i
JVC. = joint variable cost of Division i
X
JVC = joint variable cost of Division 1 and Division 2 
combined
JFC^ = joint fixed cost of Division i
JFC = joint fixed cost of Division 1 and Division 2
combined
JC^ = joint cost of Division i
JC = joint cost of Division 1 and Division 2 combined
CR^ = independent copier rental cost of Division i
The optimal price and net income of Division 1 for 
Periods 1-8 are computed as follows;
X 1 = 170/pf 
P 1 = 170^^'^X 
TR 1 = P 1 X X 1
= ( 170^'^xM X Xi
= 170 X
MR^  = dlR/dXi = 170^^ X (15/25) x Xj"'^
TC^  = 3,415 + .0306 X^  if 0 < X i < 100,000
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TC = 2,495 + 0398 X 1 if 100,000 < Xi 1 250,000
TC = 2,695 + .0390 X ^ if 250,000 <
MC = dTC^/dX^ = .0306 if 0 < Xi < 100,000
MC = .0398 if 100,000 < x% < 250,000
MC = .0390 if 250,000 < Xi
(1) if 0< X ^ < 100,000 
MR^  = MC^
170 (15/25) X = 0306
170i/2-5/( 0306 X (25/15))
2.5
1 170/(.0306 X (25/15)) ’ = 289,417
This X ^ value does not meet the condition 
(0 < X^ ^100,000). Hence, this is not the optimal 
solution.
(2) if 100,000 < X < 250,000
MR; = MC ;
,2.5
X ; = 170/(.0398 X (25/15)) = 150,010
This X ; value meets the condition (100,000 < X ^ £ 250,000). 
X * = 150,010
P : = .0398 X (25/15) = .066333
NI 066333 - .0398) x 150,010 - 2,495 = 1,485.25
(3) if 250,000 < X;
MR ; = MC ;
.2 .5
X ; = 170/(.0390 X (25/15)) • = 157,821 
This X  ^value does not meet the condition (250,000 < X^). 
Hence, this is not the optimal solution.
The optimal price and net income of Division 2 for
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Periods 1-8 are calculated in the same manner.
It is also possible to calculate the optimal prices 
and net incomes for Periods 9-13 (in which the two 
divisional managers use a common copier). First, the 
optimal prices for Division 1 and Division 2, and the 
optimal overall net income are calculated by equating the 
marginal revenue of each division with the marginal cost of 
Division 1 and Division 2 combined (in this study this 
marginal cost is the same as each division's marginal cost). 
The combined cost function for Periods 9-13 is as follows:
TC = 8,700 + .0306 X if 0 < X < 300,000
TC = 6,300 + .0386 X if 300,000 < X i 700,000
TC = 9,100 + .0346 X if 700,000 < X
The demand functions faced by the divisions are the
same as those faced when divisions used independent copiers.
The optimal prices and overall net income for Periods 9-13 
are computed as follows:
(1) if 0 < X 1  300,000 
MRi = MG
Xi = 170/(.0306x(25/15))^= 289,417 
NIR2 = MC
Xg = 500/( .0306x(22/12) )^'^= 282,552 
X = Xi + X% = 572,069 
This X value does not meet the condition
(0 < X < 300,000). Hence, this is not the optimal
solution.
114
(2) if 300,000 < X < 700,000 
MR^ = MC
= 170/(.0386x(25/15) 161,942
MR^ = MC
X^ = 500/( .0386x( 22/12) )^‘^= 169,569 
X = X^ + Xg z 331 ,511 
This X value meets the condition (300,000 < X <.700,000).
X* = 161,942 
X* = 169,569
P* = .0386x(25/15) = .064333
ACM^= (.064333 - .0386)x161,942 = 4,167.25
P* = .0386x(22/12) = .070767
CM^= (.070767 - .0386)x169,569 = 5,454.47 
CM * = CM* + CM* = 9,621.72 
NI* = CM* - FC = 9,621.72 - 6,300 = 3,321.72
(3) if 700,000 < X 
MR^ = MC
X ^ = 170/( .0346x(25/15) 212,881
MR 2 = MC
X ^  = 500/( .0346x(22/12) ) H  215,711 
X = X  ^+ X 2 = 428,592 
This X value does not meet the condition (700,000 < X). 
Hence, this is not the optimal solution.
The optimal net income of each division can be 
determined in the combined quantity range of 
300,000 < X < 700,000 as follows:
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(1) Under the N method
ÜFC = 5,600 - 300,000 x .0080 = 3,200 
JFC 1 = JFC X (CM*/CM*)
= 3,200 X (4,187.25/9,621.72) = 1,385.95 
JFC 2= JFC X (CM*/CM*)
= 3,200 X (5,454.47/9,621.72) = 1,814.05 
NI* = CM* - (IFCi + JFCi)
= 4,167.25 - (1,400 + 1,385.95) = 1,381.30
NI* = CM* - (IFC2 + JFC 2)
= 5,454.47 - (1,700 + 1,814.05) = 1,940.42
(2) Under the S method
JVC 1 = .0080 X 1 = .0080 X 161,942 = 1,295.54
JVC 2 = .0080 X 2 = .0080 X 189,569 = 1,356.55
JVC = JVCi + JVCg
= 1,295.54 + 1,356.55 = 2,652.09 
JFC = 5,600 - 300,000 x .0080 = 3,200 
JC = JVC + JFC
= 2,652.09 + 3,200 = 5,852.09 
CR^  = 2,015 + (161,942 - 100,000) x .0092 = 2,584.87 
CR. = 3,885
JC^  = .5 X (CR; + (JC - CRg))
= .5 X (2,584.87 + (5,852.09 - 3,885)1 = 2,275.98
JCg = .5 X ((JC - CRi) + CR2)
= .5 X ((5,852.09 -.2,584.87) + 3,885) = 3,576.11 
JFC; = JC^ - J V C ;
= 2,275.98 - 1,295.54 = 980.44
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JFC 2 = J C g  - JVCz
= 3,576.11 - 1,356.55 = 2,219.56 
NI* = C M *  - (IFCi + JFCi)
= 4,167.25 - (1,400 + 980.44) = 1,786.81 
NI* = C M *  - (IFC2 + J F C  2)
= 5,454.47 - (1,700 + 2,219.56) = 1,534.91
The optimal prices and net incomes for Periods 
14-19 are calculated in the same manner.
APPENDIX B
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT
(first set of instructions)
1. Introduction
Good day. In this experiment you are to act as my 
employee. I have hired you to manage one of my copy shops. 
We rent a copier from the Xerox Corporation, rent shop 
space, have one part time employee and must incur costs for 
paper, utilities, copier fluid and so on. Some of these 
costs will be the same each period while others will vary 
depending on your volume of business. I am going to 
evaluate your performance on your ability to maximize short- 
run profits. For each time period (trial) of the experiment 
I am going to prepare an income statement based upon your 
performance. Because our business performs services only to 
order, we will not need to be concerned with inventories.
Because I own several small businesses, I cannot 
keep up with the competitive characteristics of the market 
place for each of them. I have hired you to do the best you 
can in the actual competitive market place in which your 
shop is located. I do know, and can tell you, that other
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copy shops in the area tend to advertise their prices to the 
nearest tenth of a cent per copy (such as 2.6 cents per copy 
or 9.8 cents per copy). Your major task as the shop manager 
will be to establish a selling price per copy (to the 
nearest tenth of a cent) which will maximize our net income.
I realize that you probably don't have much 
experience in managing such a shop. Therefore, I will let 
you operate for four periods (trials) before beginning to 
measure your performance. During this trial period you 
should attempt to learn as much as you can about how volume 
is affected by the selling price you specify and about how 
costs vary with volume. After the four trials periods are 
over, I will begin to record your performance.
As promised earlier, I will give a $50 bonus to the 
manager who earns the greatest profit in the same situation 
that you face. That is, there will be a total of thirty 
persons acting as the manager of this same shop. The person 
who does best will receive the bonus. By the way, the other 
person in this experiment is not competing with you. He or 
she is in a slightly different business environment. It is 
possible that both you and the other person here today could 
each receive a $50 bonus if each of you does the best jobs 
relative to the other persons who will take each of your 
respective places.
Since you are competing with other students who 
will take your place, it is to your benefit to not to talk
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with other persons about the process of this experiment. In 
addition, doing so may mislead people subsequently 
participating in this experiment. I have prepared many 
different experimental environments, and therefore actions 
which are appropriate for your environment could be 
disastrous in one of the other environments.
2. Task
You are to now set a selling price per copy (to the 
nearest tenth of a cent for the next operating period).
After you do so, I will give you an income statement which 
summarizes the operating results for the period. Your first 
price should be set using "common sense": i.e., what you 
know about the general market for copies.
Are there any questions?
(First eight trials are conducted.)
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Division manager 
Name _______
Periods Selling Price Net Income
1  0 $___________
2  0 $_
3  0 $_
4  0 $_
5  0 $_
6  0 $.
7  0 $_
8  0 $_
9  0 $_
10  0 $_
11  0 $.
12  0 $_
13  0 $
14  0 $_
15  0 $_
16  0 $_
17  0 $_
18  0 $_
19  0 $
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(second set of instructions)
I have just been approached by a salesman who has 
convinced me that we can save some money if I combine the 
production operations of your copy shop with those of the 
other manager who is here today. Therefore, for the next 
several periods I will combine the production operations, 
and you and the other manager will jointly use a copier.
Your market conditions (your competition) will not change. 
However, you will notice a change in your operating costs. 
Again, remember that the other manager here today operates 
in a slightly different economic environment than you do, 
thus you are not competing with him or her.
(Five trials are conducted.)
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(third set of instructions)
(for the net realizable value method)
D i v i s i o n  manager
Name _________________
For the previous five periods I divided the cost to 
rent the copier between you and the other manager in 
proportion to the amount of income you each earned.
An example of the calculation of your charge for 
using the copier and some other related information is 
provided with this sheet. Referring to this information, 
please answer the following questions.
1. How do you feel about the way in which your share of
the cost for using the copier was determined?
(1) The computation is very unfair.
(2) The computation is a little unfair.
(3) The computation is moderately fair.
(4) The computation is very fair.
2. What factors influenced your response to question 1?
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(third set of instructions)
(for the Shapley value method)
D i v i s i o n  m anager
Name
For the previous five periods I divided the cost to 
rent the copier between you and the other manager by 
calculating the total cost each of you would have incurred 
had you used the equipment you used in trials 1-8. The 
total savings from using the new copier were then split 
evenly between you and the other manager.
An example of the calculation of your charge for 
using the copier and some other related information is 
provided with this sheet. Referring to this information, 
please answer the following questions.
1. How do you feel about the way in which your share of
the cost for using the copier was determined?
(1) The computation is very unfair.
(2) The computation is a little unfair.
(3) The computation is moderately fair.
(4) The computation is very fair.
2. What factors influenced your response to question 1?
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(fourth set of instructions)
I have just learned that there has been a major 
economic change in the market place. The prices which you 
have been setting for the last several periods may no longer 
provide a satisfactory net profit. I suggest you consider 
changing your prices, for it may very well lead to a better 
level of profits than you would otherwise experience. 
Remember your goal is to maximize the profits we earn.
(Six trials are conducted.)
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fifth set of instructions!
D i v i s i o n  manager
Name ________________
For the next set of trials I will give you the 
choice to either return to using the copier you used in 
Periods 1-8 or to continue to share the copier which you 
have used with the other manager during Periods 9-19.
1. Do you wish to continue sharing the copier used in 
trials 9-19?
(1) Yes.
(2) No.
2. What factors led to your decision in 1?
3. I explained to you earlier how your charge for the 
use of the new copier was calculated. Now that you 
have had some experience in setting prices while 
knowing the way the copier costs were charged to you, 
how do you feel about the way in which your share of 
the cost for using the copier was determined?
(1) The computation is very unfair.
(2) The computation is a little unfair.
(3) The computation is moderately fair.
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(4) The computation is very fair.
4. What factors influenced your response to question 3?
5. Would you explain briefly what factors you considered 
when selecting your selling prices?
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Name _______________
1. I need some information about you in analyzing the data 
obtained from this game. Please answer the questions 
below. I will use the information for data analysis 
purposes only.
(1) What is your classification (e.g., junior, senior, 
etc.)?
(2) What is your major (e.g., accounting, management, 
etc.)?
(3) Have you ever worked in business (part-time or 
full-time)? If yes, in what business, in what 
position, and how long?
2. In April I will be able to determine the $50 winner.
You might be the winner. Will you still have the same 
telephone number in April that you gave me earlier?
If not, please give me a permanent telephone number 
or address through which you can be reached.
Telephone # _____________________________
Address
3. If you wish to get a summary of the general results 
of this game, please give an address at which you can 
be reached in April.
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Address _________________
APPENDIX C
COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR MAKING THE INCOME STATEMENTS 
(INDEPENDENT USE OF THE COPIER)
REAL PI,P2,X1,X2,TR1,TR2,FC11,FC12,FCI3,FCt4,FC2l,FC22,FC23, 
A FC24,UVC1,UVC2,VC1,VC2,TC1,TC2,NI1,NI2,CR1,CR2,R(2),
B UVC11,UVC12,UVC21 ,UVC22,E1,E2,S1,32,Ml,M2 
DOUBLE PRECISION D
DATA FC11,FC12,FC13,FC14,FC21,FC22,FC23,FC24/2015.,500.,
A 600.,300.,3885.,600.,700.,400./
DATA UVCI1,UVC12,UVC21,UVC22/.O0?2,.0034,.0037,.0060/
DATA UVCI,UVC2/.0306,.0306/
D=999999.D0 
DO 5 1=1,8 
CALL GGNML(H,2,R)
REAIK5,*) P1,P2
X1=170/P1**2.5
X2=500/P2*h2.2
M1=0.0
M2=0.0
S1=.00137HXl
S2=.00075kX2
E1=(R(1))*S1+M1
E2=(R(2))*S2+M2
X1=X1+E1
X2=X2+E2
TR1=P1:IX1
TR2=P2:i'X2
VC1=UVCUX1
VC2=UVC2t:X2
IF (XI .LE. 100000.) GO TO 1000
IF (XI .LE. 250000.) GO TO 10O1
CR1=FC1 1 +150000.;tUVC11 + (X1 -250000. )*UVC12 
GO TO 1002
1000 CR1=FC11 
GO TO 1002
1001 CR1=FC11+(X1-100000.)+UVC11
1002 IF (X2 .LE. 300000.) GO TO 2000
IF (X2 .LE. 500000.) GO TO 2001
CR2=FC21+200000.$UVC2I+(X2-500000.):HUVC22 
GO TO 2002
2000 CR2=FC21 
GO TO 2002
2001 CR2=FC21 + (X2-300000.)#VC21
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2002 TC1=CR14FC124FC13+FCM+VCI 
TC2=CR2+FC22+FC23 ^ FC2•4+VC2 
NI1=TR1-TC1 
NI2=TR2-TC2 
N=I
URITE(6,10) N
10 FORMAT(IX,'MONTHLY INCOME STATEMENT OF DIVISION 1 
A 5X,'(PERIOD',IX,12,'•)'///)
URITE(6,11)
11 FORMAKIX,'REVENUE:')
URITE(6,12) X1,P1,TR1
12 F0RMAT(4X,'SALES',10X,F8.0,IX,'COPIES',IX,IX,
A F5.3,15X,'$',F10.2//>
WRITE(6,13)
13 FORMAT(IX,'EXPENSES;')
WRITE(6,14) CR1
14 FORMAT(4X,'COPIER RENTAL',30X,'$',F8.2/)
WRITE(6,15) FC12
15 FORMAT(4X,'SHOP RENTAL',33X,FS.2/)
URITE(6,16) FC13
16 F0RHAT(4X,'SALARY',38X,F8.2/)
URITE(6,17) FC14
17 F0RHAT(4X,'UTILITIES',35X,F8.2/)
URITE(6,18) XI,UVCI,VC1,TCI
18 FORMAT(4X,'MATERIALS',6X,F8.0,IX,'COPIES',IX,':K',IX,'$', 
A F6.4,4X,F8.2,3X,F10.2//)
WRITE(6,19) Nil
19 FORMAT!IX,'NET INCOME',47X,'$',F10.2//////)
URITE(6,20) N
20 FORMATdX,'MONTHLY INCOME STATEMENT OF DIVISION 2',
A 5X,'(PERIOD',IX,12,')'///)
URITE(6,11)
URITE(6,12) X2,P2,TR2
WRITE(6,13)
WRITE(6,14) CR2 
- 'WRITE(6,-15)-'Ft22'
URITE(6,16) FC23 
URITE(6,17) FC24 
URITE(6,13) X2,UVC2,VC2,TC2 
WRITE(6,19) NI2 
5 CONTINUE 
STOP 
END
APPENDIX D
COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR MAKING THE INCOME STATEMENTS AND 
THE SUMMARY OF THE OPERATING RESULTS
(JOINT USE OF THE COPIER) (Periods 9-13)
REAL X1,X2,X,i11,H2,Sl,S2,R(2),EI,E2,F'l ,P2,TR1,TR2,FC11,FC12, 
A FC13,FC14,FC21,FC22,FC23,FC24,UVC1,UVC2,VCI,VC2,HIB1,
B NIB2,NIB,UVC11,UVC12,UVC21,UVC22,CR1,CR2,CR,JFCI,JFC2,
C JFC,JVC1,JVC2,JVC,JC1,JC2,JC,NRV1,NRV2,NRV,CSI,CS2,CS,
D X1P,X2P,NIB1P,NIB2P,TR,TR1P,TR2F',FC2,FC12P,FC22P,FC3,
E FC13P,FC23P,FC4,FC14P,FC24P,VC,VC1P,VC2P,NI,NI1P,NI2P,
F JC1P,JC2P,CRIP,CR2P,CS1P,CS2P,TCI,TC2,NIt,NI2
DOUBLE PRECISION D
DATA FCl1,FC12,FC13,FC14,FC2I,FC22,FC23,FC24/2015.,500.,
A 600.,300.,3885.,600., 700.,400./
DATA UUC11,UVC12,UVC21,UVC22/.0092,.0034,.0037,.0060/
DATA UVCI,UVC2/.0306,.0306/
D=999997.D0 
no 5 1=1,5 
CALL GGNML(D,2,R)
READ(5,:c) P1,P2 
X1 = 170/Pti':t'2.5 
X2=500/P2t::t:2.2 
M1=0.0 
«2=0.0
S1=.00137+X1
S2=.00075*X2
E1=(R(1)):HS1+M1
E2=(R(2))*S2+M2
X1=XUE1
X2=X2+E2
TR1=P1*X1
TR2=P2*X2
VC1=UVC1:kX1
VC2=UVC2+X2
IF (XI .LE. 100000) GO TO 1000
IF (XI .LE. 250000) GO TO 1001
CRl=FC11+150000»UVC11+(XI-250000)»UVC12 
GO TO 1002
1000 CR1=FC11 
GO TO 1002
1001 CR1=FC1 1 + (X1 -100000):|:UVC11
1002 IF (X2 .LE. 300000) GO TO 2000
IF (X2 .LE. 500000) GO TO 2001
CR2=FC21+200000:MJVC21 + (X2-500000):tUVC22
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GO TO 2002
2000 CR2=FC21 
GO TO 2002
2001 CR2=FC21f(X2-300000):|:UVC2l
2002 X=X1+X2
IF (X .LE. 300000.) GO TO 3000
IF (X .LE. 700000.) GO TO 3001
JFG=5600f400000:K.0080-700000$.0040
JVC1=.0040*X1
JVC2=.0040$X2
GO TO 3002
3000 JFC=560O 
JVC1=0.
JVC2=0.
60 TO 3002
3001 JFC=5600-300000$.0080 
JVC1=.0080$X1 
JVC2=.0080$X2
3002 JVC=JVC1+JVC2- 
JC=JFC+JVC 
NRV1=TR1-JVC1-VC1 
NRV2=TR2-JVC2-VC2 
NRV=NRV1+NRV2
C **$*$
C NET REALIZABLE VALUE METHOD 
IF (NRV .EQ. 0.) GO TO 100 
JFC1=JFC$NRVt/NRV 
JFC2=JFC*NRV2/NRV 
GO TO 500 
100 JFC1=JFC».5 
JFC2=JFC$.5 
500 JC1=JVCUJFC1 
JC2=JVC2+JFC2 
C **$$*
C SHAPLEY VALUE METHOD 
C JC1=.5*(CR1+(JC-CR2))
C JC2=.5*((JC-CR1)+CR2)
C * * * * *
TC1=XU«FC12+FC13+FC14fVC; )
TC2=JC2+(FC22+FC23+FC24+VC2)
NI1=TR1-TC1
NI2=TR2-TC2
CR=CRI+CR2
CS=CR-JC
CSI=CR1-JC1
CS2=CR2-JC2
NIB1=TR1-(FC12fFC13+FCI4+VC1)
NIB2=TR2-(FC22fFC23+FC24+'.'C2)
NIB=NIB1+NIB2
TR=TR1+TR2
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FC2=FC12+FC22
FC3=FC13+FC23
FC4=FC14+FC24
VC=VC1+VC2
NI=NI1+NI2
X1F-100+X1/X
X2P=100+X2/X
NIB1P=100+NIB1/NIB
NIB2P=I00*NIB2/NIB
JC1P=10O»JC1/JC
JC2P=100:HJC2/JC
TR1P=100KTR1/TR
TR2P=100:|:TR2/TR
FC12P=100»FC12/'FC2
FC22P=10O*FC22/FC2
FC13P=100»FCI3/FC3
FC23P=IOOtFC23/FC3
FC14P=100't=FC14/FC4
FC24P=10O*FC24/FC4
VC1P=100$VC1/VC
VC2P=100i:VC2/VC
NIIP=100$NI1/NI
NI2P=100t-NI2/NI
CR1P=tOO»CR1/CR
CR2P=100*CR2/CR
CS1P=100*CS1/CS
CS2P=10O:t=CS2/CS
N=If8
URITE(6,10) N
10 FORMAT(IX,'MONTHLY INCOME STATEMENT OF DIVISION I',
A 5X,'(PERIOD',IX,12,•')'///)
WRITE(6,11)
11 FORMATdX,'REVENUE:')
WRITE(6,12) X1,P1,TR1
12 F0RMAT(4X, 'SALES',1 OX,F8.0,IX,'COPIES-,IX,'t:',IX,'$',
A F5.3,15X,'$',F10.2//)
WRITE(6,13)
13 FORMATdX, 'EXPENSES:')
WRITE(6,14) JC1
14 FORMAT(4X,'YOUR SHARE OF COPIER RENTAL',1û X,'$',FS.2/) 
URITE(6,15) FC12
15 F0RMAT(4X,'SH0P RENTAL',33X,F8.2/)
WRITE(6,16) FC13
16 F0RHAT(4X,'SALARY',38X,F3.2/)
URITE(6,17) FCl4
17 F0RHAT(4X,'UTILITIES',35X,F8.2/)
WRITE(6,18) XI,UVCI,VC1,TCI
18 F0RMAT(4X,'MATERIALS',6X,F8.0,IX,'COPIES',IX,'^t',IX,'$', 
A F6.4,4X,F8.2,3X,F10.2//)
URITE(6,19) Nil
19 FORMATdX,'NET I N C O M E ' , 4 7 X , F 1 0 . 2//////)
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IF (I .ME. 5) GO TO 210 
URITE(6,230) N
230 F0RMAT(4X,'SUMMARY OF THE OPERATING RESULTS FOR THE', 
A IX,'TWO DIVISIONS FOR PERIOD',1X,12///)
URITE(6,191)
191 F0Ri1AT(23X,'TOTAL',7X,'DIVISION 1 ',12X,'DIVISION 2'7) 
URITE(6,192)
192 FORMATdX,'1. COPIER RENTAL')
WRITE(6,193) JC,JC1,JC1P,JC2,JC2P
193 FDRHAT(4X,'C0ST CHARGED T0;',1X,F3.2,2(3X,F8 .2,
A IX,'(',F5.I,IX,'%',')')/)
URITE(6,195) TR,TR1,TRtP,TR2,TR2P
195 FORMATdX,'2. SALES ', 12X,F8.2,2(3X,F8.2,1X, ' (•',
A F5.1,IX,'%',')')/)
URITE(6,1?6) FC2,FC12,FC12P,FC22,FC22P
196 FORMATdX,'3. SHOP RENTAL',6X,F8.2,2(3X,F3.2,IX,' ,  
A F5.1,1X,'%',')')/)
URITE(6,197) FC3,FC13,FC13P,FC23,FC23P
197 FORMATdX,'4. SALARY', 11 X,F3.2,2(3X,F3.2, IX, ' ( ',
A F5.1,IX,'%',')')/)
URITE(6,198) FC4,FC14,FC14P,FC24,FC24P
198 FORMATdX,'5. UTILITIES',8X,F3.2,2(3X,F8.2,IX,'(',
A F5.1,IX,'%',')')/)
WRITE(6,199) VC,VC),VC1P,VC2,VC2P
199 FORMATdX,'6. MATERIALS',8X,F8.2,2(3X,F8.2,1 X,' (',
A F5.1,IX,'%',')')/)
WRITE(6,200) HI,KI1,NI1P,NI2,NI2P
200 FORMATdX,'?. NET INCOME',7X,F8.2,2(3X,F8.2,1X,'C, 
A F5.1,IX,'%',')')/)
URITE(6,201)
201 FORMAT(IX,'8. NUMBER OF COPIES')
URiTE(6.,202) X,X1 ,X1 P,X2,X2P
202 FORMAT(TOX,'SOLD',7X,F8.0,2(3X,F8.0,1X,
A '(',F5.1,IX,■■•%',•')')/)
URITE(6,203)
203 FORMATdX,'9. NET INCOME BEFORE')
URITE(6,204)
204 FORMAT!4X,'CHARGE FOR USE OF')
URITE(6,300) NIB,NIDI,NIB1P,NIB2,NID2P
300 FORMAT(10X,'COPIER',5X,F8.2,2(3X,F8.2,1X,
A '(',F5.1,IX,'%',')')/)
URITE(6,205)
205 FORMATdX,'10. COST IF EACH )
URITE(6,206)
206 FORMATOX,'DIVISION USED A')
URITE(6,207) CR,CR1,CR1P,CR2,CR2P
207 rORMATCSX,'SEPARATE COPIER',1X,F8.2,2(3X,F8.2,
A IX,'(',F5.1,IX,•'%'■,')')/)
URITE(6,208)
208 F O R M A T d X , '11. COST SAVINGS')
URITE(6,209)
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(Periods 14-19)
REAL X1,X2,X,M1,M2,S1,S2,R(2),EI,E2,F1,P2,TR1,TR2,FC11,FC12, 
A FCi3.FC14,FC21,FC22,FC23,FC24,UVC1,UVC2,VC1,VC2,NIB1,
B NIB2,NIB,UVC11,UVC12,UVC21,UVC22,CR1,CR2,CR, JFCI ,JFC2,
C JFC,JVC1,JVC2,JVC,JCI,JC2,JC,NRV1,NRV2,NRV,CS1,CS2,CS,
D X1P,X2P,NIB1P,NIB2P,TR,TR1F',TR2P,FC2,FC12P,FC22P,FC3,
E FC13P,FC23P,FC4,FC14P,FC24P,VC,VC1P,VC2P,NI,NI1P,NI2P,
F JC1P,JC2P,CRIP,CR2P,CS1P,CS2P,TCI,TC2,NII,NI2
DOUBLE PRECISION D
DATA FC11,FC12,FC13,FC14,FC21,FC22,FC23,FC24/2015.,500.,
A 600.,300.,3885.,600.,700.,400./
DATA UVCI1,UVC12,UVC21,UVC22/.0092,.0034,.0037,.0060/
DATA UVCI,UVC2/.0306,.0306/
D=999?95.D0 
DO 5 1=1,6 
CALL GGNML(D,2,R)
READ(5,t.) P1,P2 
X1=16/P1**3.3 
X2=1 625/P2*M.8 
M1=0.0 
M2=0.0
S1 = .00210^tX1
S2=.00076*X2
Et = (R(1))=>S1+«1
E2=(R(2))>S2+M2
X1=X1+E1
X2=X2+E2
TR1=P1*X1
TR2=P2*X2
VC1=UVC1:tX1
VC2=UVC2^*X2
IF (XI .LE. 100000) GO TO 1000
IF (XI .LE. 250000) GO TO 1001
CR1 =FC1 1 + 150000:tUVC11 + (X1 -250000)»UVC12 
GO TO 1002
1000 CR1=FC11 
GO TO 1002
1001 CR1=FC11 + (X1-100000):i:UVC11
1002 IF (X2 .LE. 300000) GO TO 2000
IF (X2 .LE. 500000) GO TO 2001
CR2=FC21+200000:iUVC21 + (X2-500000)*UVC22 
GO TO 2002
2000 CR2=FC21 
GO TO 2002
2001 CR2=FC21+(X2-300000) kUVC21
2002 X=X1+X2
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IF (X .LE. 300000.) GO TO 3000
IF (X .LE. 700000.) GO TO 3001
JFC=5600+400000*.0080-700000*.0040
JVC1=.0040*X1
JVC2=.0040*X2
GO TO 3002
3000 JFC=5600 
JVC 1=0.
JVC2=0.
GO TO 3002
3001 JFC=5600-300000*.0080 
JVC1=.0080*X1 
JVC2=.0030*X2
3002 JVC=JVC1+JVC2 
JC=JFC+JVC 
NRV1=TR1-JVC1-VC1 
NRV2=TR2-JVC2-VC2 
NRV=NRV1+NRV2
C *****
C NET REALIZABLE VALUE METHOD
IF (NRV .EQ. 0.) GO TO 100 
JFCI=JFC*NRV1/NRV 
JFC2=JFC*NRV2/HRV 
GO TO 500 
10O JFC1=JFC*.5 
JFC2=JFC*.5 
500 JC1=JVCUJFC1 
JC2=JVC2+JFC2 
C *****
C SHAPLEY VALUE METHOD 
C JC1=.5*(CR1+(JC-CR2))
C JC2=.5*((JC-CR1)+CR2)
C *****
TC1=JC1+(FC12+FC13+FC14+VC1)
TC2=JC2*(FC22+FC23+FC24+VC2)
NI1=TR1-TC1
NI2=TR2-TC2
CR=CR1+CR2
C3=CR-JC
CS1=CR1-JC1
CS2=CR2-JC2
NIB1=TR1-(FC12+FC13+FC14+VC1)
NIB2=TR2-(FC22+FC23+FC24*VC2)
NIB=NIB1+NIB2
TR=TR1+TR2
FC2=FC12+FC22
FC3=FC13+FC23
FC4=FC14+FC24
VC=VC1*VC2
NI=NI1 H1I2
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X1P=100*X1/X
X2P=100$X2/X
NIB1P=100:tNIB1/NIB
NIB2P=100*NIB2/NIB
JC1F'=100*JC1/JC
JC2P=100+JC2/JC
TR1P=100*TP1/TR
TR2P=100^HR2/TR
FC12P=100*FC12/FC2
FC22P=100*FC22/FC2
FC13P=100^tFC13/FC3
FC23P=100*FC23/FC3
FC14P=100i'FC14/FC4
FC24P=100:t:FC24/FC4
VC1P=100*VC1/VC
VC2P=100:iVC2/VC
NI1P=100+NI1/NI
NI2P=100tNI2/NI
CR1P=100*CR1/CR’
CR2P=100*CR2/CR
CS1P=100*CS1/CS
CS2P=100:kCS2/CS
N=I+13
WRITE(6,10) N
10 FORMATdX,'MONTHLY INCOME STATEMENT OF DIVISION 1',
A 5X/(PERI0D',IX,12,")'///)
URITE(6,11)
11 FORMAT(IX,'REVENUE:')
WRITE(6,12) X1,P1,TR1
12 FORHAK4X,"SALES',10X,F8.0,IX,'COPIES',1X, :r,IX,
A F5.3,15X,'J',F10.2//>
WRITE(6,13)
13 FORMAT(IX,"EXPENSES;")
WRITE(6,14) JC1
14 FDRMAT(4X,"Y0UR SHARE OF COPIER RENTAL ,16X,"$",F8.2/) 
WRITE(6,15) FC12
15 FORMAT(4X,"SHOP RENTAL",33X,F3.2/)
WRITE(6,16) FC13
16 FORMAT(4X,"SALARY",38X,F8.2/')
URITE(6,17) FC14
17 F0RMAT(4X,"UTILITIES',35X,F8.2/)
URITE(6,18) X1,UVC1,VC1,TC1
18 FORMAT(4X,"MATERIALS",6X,F3.0,IX,"COPIES",IX,IX,
A F6.4,4X,F8.2,3X,F10.2//)
WRITE(6,19) Nil
19 FORMAT(IX,"NET INCOME",47X,,F10.2//////)
IF (I .NE. 6) GO TO 210
URITE(6,230) N
230 FORMAT(4X,"SUMMARY OF THE OPERATING RESULTS FOR THE", 
A IX,"TWO DIVISIONS FOR PERIOD",IX,12///)
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WRITE(6,191)
19V. FORMAT (23XrT0TAr77X-,’'DIVISION V n Z X y n H V l S l D H  2^/1 
-'URITE(6,192)
192 FORMAT(IX,'1. COPIER RENTAL')
WRITE(6,193) JC,JC1,JC1P,JC2,JC2P
193 F0RHAT(4X,'C0ST CHARGED T0:',1X,F8.2,2(3X,F3.2,
A IX,'C,F5.1,IX,'%',')')/)
URITE(6,195) TR,TR1,TR1P,TR2,TR2P
195 FORMAT dX,'2. SALES',12X,F8.2,2(3X,F8.2,1X,'(',
A F5.1,IX,'%",')')/,}
WRITE(6,196) FC2,FC12,FC12P,FC22,FC22P
196 FORMAT dX,'3. SHOP RENTAL',éX,F8.2,2(3X,F8.2, IX, '(',
A F5.1,IX,'X',")')/)
URITE(6,197) FC3,FC13,FC13F',FC23,FC23P
197 F O R M A T d X , '4. SALARY', 11 X,F8.2,2(3X,F3.2,IX,'(
A F5.1,IX,'2',')•')/)
URITE(6,198) FC4,FC14,FC14P,FC24,FC24P 
193 FORMATdX,'5. UTILITIES',BX,F8.2,2(3X,F8.2,IX,M",
A F5.1,IX,'%',')')/)
WRITE(6,199) VC,VC1,VC1P,VC2,VC2P
199 FORMAT dX,'6. MATERIALS',3X ,FB. 2,2(3X,FS.2, IX,'( ^
A F5.1,IX,"%',')')/)
URITE(6,200) NI,NI1,N11P,NI2,NI2P
200 FORMAT dX,"7. NET INC0ME',7X,FS.2,2(3X,F8.2,1X, '(',
A F5.1,IX,•'2',•')')/)
URITE(6,201)
201 FORMAT dX,"3. NUMBER OF COPIES')
URITE(6,202) X,X1,X1P,X2,X2P
202 F0RMATd0X,'S0LD',7X,F3.0,2(3X,F8.O,1X,
A d',F5.1,IX,'%',')')/)
URITE(6,203)
203 FORMATdX,'?. NET INCOME BEFORE )
WRITE(6,204)
204 F0RMAT(4X,'CHARGE FOR USE OF')
WRITE(6,300) NIB,NIB1,N1B1P,NIB2,NIB2P
300 FORMATdOX,'COPIER',5X,F3.2,2(3X,F8.2,IX,
A '(',F5.1,IX,'%',')')/)
URITE(6,205)
205 FORMAT dX,'10. COST IF EACH )
URITE(6,206)
206 F0RMAT(5X,'DIVISION USED A')
URITE(6,207) CR,CR1,CR1P,CR2,CR2P
207 F0RMAT(5X,'SEPARATE C0PIER',1X,F8.2,2(3X,F8.2,
A IX,'(',F5.1,IX,'%',')')/)
URITE(6,208)
208 F O R MAT dX,'11. COST SAVINGS')
URITEC6,209)
209 FORMAT(5X,'(LINE 10 MINUS')
URITE(6,301) CS.CSl,CS1P,CS2,CS2P
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3»! F0RMAT(6X,"LINE 1)',8X,F8.2,2(3X,F8.2,1X,
A ' C , F 6 . 1 /%'/)')//////)
210 URITE(6,20) N 
20 FORMAT(IX/MONTHLY INCOME STATEMENT OF DIVISION 2 %  
A 5 X / ( P E R I 0 D \ 1 X , 12, ')'///)
URITE(6,11)
WRITE(6,12) X2,P2,TR2 
WRITE(6,13)
URITE(6,14) JC2 
URITE(6,15) FC22 
WRITE(6,16) FC23 
URITE(6,17) FC24 
URITE(6,18) X2,UVC2,VC2,TC2 
WRITE(6,19) NI2 
IF (I .NE. 6) GO TO 220
URITE(6 
WRITE(6 
URITE(6 
WRITE(6 
URITE(6 
URITE(6 
WRITE(6 
WRITE(6 
WRITE(6 
WRITE(6 
WRITE(6 
URITE(6 
WRITE(6 
URITE(6 
WRITE(6 
WRITE(6 
WRITE(6 
WRITE(6 
WRITE(6 
URITE(6 
WRITE(6 
220 CONTINUE 
5 CONTINUE 
STOP 
END
230) N
191)
192)
193) JC,JC1 ,JC1F',JC2,JC2P
195) TR,TR1,TR1P,TR2,TR2P
196) FC2,FC12,FC12P,FC22,FC22P
197) FC3,FC13,FC13P,FC23,FC23P
198) FC4,FC14,FC14P,FC24,FC24P
199) VC, VC1,VC1P,VC2,VC2P
200) NI,N11,NI1P,N12,NI2P
2 0 1)
202) X,X1,X1P,X2,X2P
203)
204)
300) NI6,NIB1,NIB1P,NIB2,NIB2P
205)
206)
207) CR,CR1,CR1P,CR2,CR2P
208)
209)
301) CS,CS1,CS1P,CS2,CS2P
APPENDIX E
REQUEST FOR STUDENTS' PARTICIPATION IN THE EXPERIMENT 
Earn $54 in one hour!
I have developed a simple game to help me gather 
information on managerial decision making. The data will be 
very helpful for my doctoral studies at O.U. I now need a 
large number of people to play this game and answer a few 
questions about the game.
The game requires one hour. I wi11 pay $4 if you 
will participate. In addition, for each group of thirty 
students who participate, a prize of $50 will be awarded to 
the one member of the group who gets the best results in the 
game (ties, if any, will be broken by a suitable random 
process).
The game is not difficult. It requires you to 
attempt to set an optimal selling price for a service. 
Persons participating in the game so far, have found it 
interesting.
If you are willing to help me by participating in 
this game, would you please indicate below your name, 
telephone number and the days and times which would be most
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convenient for you. I wi11 call you to establish a 
specific, mutually convenient time for you to play the game.
Thank you.
Hai G. Park
O.U. Doctoral Candidate
This experiment relates to the subject matter of 
Accounting 2123. As such the School of Accounting 
encourages your participation. In recognition of the fact 
that we believe this will be a good learning experience for 
you, you will receive 5 points of extra credit to be added 
to your Accounting 2123 exam scores if you participate.
Shane Moriarity 
Accounting 2123 Coordinator
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Name Telephone #
When is the best time to call?
e.g., evenings?)
Please marK with an x times which would be 
convenient for you.
1 0 : 0 0  
11:00 
12 : 00  
1 : 00 
2 : 0 0  
3:00 
4:00 
5:00 
6:00 
7:00 
8:00 
9:00
Mon. lue. Wed. Thurs. Fri
A.M.-----
MN o o n  --- —  -
D WI __________r . IVl, ~ —
